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SECTION 1983 AND SEX ABUSE IN SCHOOLS: MAKING A
FEDERAL CASE OUT OF IT
LAURA OREN*
When I accepted the invitation to write for this Symposium, I had
in mind a pair of cases decided en banc by a divided Fifth Circuit,
authored by the same judge, both involving sexual abuse of school
children, but with startlingly different results. In Walton v. Alexan-
der,' the Fifth Circuit held that a supervisor's failure to protect a fif-
teen-year-old deaf boy at a residential state school from sexual assault
by another student created no § 1983 liability.2 In an opinion by
Judge Jolly, the Fifth Circuit ruled that DeShaney v. Winnebago De-
partment of Social Services3 precluded recovery because the child at-
tended the state school "through his own free will (or that of his
parents) without any coercion by the state."
4
Less than a year earlier, however, a fifteen-year-old girl who al-
leged she was the victim of sexual abuse in school had fared far better
in the hands of the Fifth Circuit in an opinion written by the same
Judge Jolly. In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,5 a student
alleged that the school's principal and superintendent failed to protect
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. As always, I appreciate the able
assistance of Harriet Richman, the University of Houston Law Center Faculty Services Libra-
ran. Students Amy Metcalf, Steve Loden, Jeff Hopkins, and Cindy Bickham provided research
assistance and the University of Houston Law Foundation provided financial support. Special
thanks to my colleagues Irene Rosenberg and David Dow and to Bruce Palmer who did more
than his fair share of everything.
1. 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), modifying 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir. 1994).
2. See id. at 1305. Christopher Walton was a fifteen-year-old residential student at the
Mississippi State School for the Deaf when he was attacked by another student. See Walton v.
Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Garwood, J., concurring). Both children were suspended briefly,
but later returned to school. See Walton, 44 F.3d at 1300. A year later, after the school closed
one of its dormitories, Walton was thrown together with his aggressor in the remaining unit and
was again assaulted. See id. The district court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds of qualified immunity was appealed to the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 1299.
Originally, a Fifth Circuit panel had reversed the district court, but held that the superintendent
stood in a "special relationship" to the victim, and therefore had a "duty not to be deliberately
indifferent to Walton's due process rights." Id. at 1300. The panel's decision was reheard en
banc. See id. at 1297.
3. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
4. Walton, 44 F.3d at 1305.
5. 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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her from the sexual predations of a teacher. 6 The biology teacher and
coach, who had a history of inappropriate behavior toward female stu-
dents, aggressively pursued first-year-student Jane Doe, in school and
out, until he finally induced her to engage in intercourse with him.
7
The teacher's campaign did not go unremarked: Teachers and parents
lodged complaints about his behavior with female students in general
and with Jane Doe in particular.8 Administrators failed to take the
allegations seriously or act decisively against the teacher despite nu-
merous warning signs. 9 The Fifth Circuit held that school officials are
liable for supervisory failures that result in the molestation of a school
child by a teacher if those failures manifest a deliberate indifference to
the constitutional rights of that child.' 0
In focusing on supervisory liability, the court consciously avoided
becoming trapped in the DeShaney mire. 11 I have written elsewhere
to criticize the application of DeShaney to child welfare practice and
foster care.' 2 In that case, the Supreme Court's preoccupation with
6. See id. at 445, 449-50. Since the case was heard on a motion for summary judgment, the
court was obligated to view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See id. at 446
n.1.
7. See id. at 447-48.
8. See id. at 446-49.
9. See id. at 446-48.
10. See id. at 445, 453, 456-57.
11. See id. at 451 n.3.
12. See Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process:
DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REv. 659, 683-87 (1990) [hereinafter Oren, DeShaney in Con-
text]; Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process Right to
Safety, 69 N.C. L. REv. 113, 128-29 (1990) [hereinafter Oren, Unfinished Business].
In DeShaney, the Court made it clear that the government's duty to protect children or
other citizens could not be derived from common-law tort principles, the so-called "special rela-
tionship" exception to a general no-duty rule. Instead, it drew a bright line based on "custody":
If a citizen is in the custody of the state, then the government has a duty to protect her from
foreseeable injury. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 198-202
(1989). It had-no responsibility, however, to save four-year-old Joshua from his father's brutality
inflicted on the child after the state returned him to his parent's custody in the "free world." See
id. at 201. Only a state deprivation of liberty through taking someone into "custody" creates the
right kind of constitutionally-based "special relationship." See id. at 200. The Court left the
precise contours of the special relationship that creates the duty to protect unclear. Criminal or
civil incarceration certainly qualifies, and the Court suggested that foster care might as well. See
id. It said nothing about schools in DeShaney. See id. at 200-02.
In a recent case the Court used fairly strong "custodial" language to justify random drug
testing of high school athletes. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391-92
(1995). In upholding the drug testing policy, the Court observed that public schools have "custo-
dial and tutelary" power over school children "permitting a degree of supervision and control
that could not be exercised over free adults." Id. at 2392. Perhaps nervous about the DeShaney
implications, Justice Scalia hastened to add some dicta signalling his view about schools and
"custody": "[W]e do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a
degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional 'duty to protect'...." Id.
(quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). Professor Irene Rosenberg has criticized Acton and this
dictum for what seems to be yet another example of the double-bind for children: "[H]eads the
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the need to draw a bright line between constitutional and ordinary
tort led to an abstract and ideological rejection of a "duty to protect"
outside of very limited circumstances. 13 By contrast, Taylor's focus on
supervisory liability provides an opportunity to move beyond this es-
sentially negative fixation to a more positive exercise: opening an ap-
propriate dialogue between federal law and the common law of tort.
The structure and past interpretation of § 1983 justifies this ap-
proach. The famous statement in Monroe v. Pape,14 the foundation
case of § 1983, has been repeated so many times that it is a truism: The
civil rights statute "should be read against the background of tort lia-
bility that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of
his actions."'15 Even more significant, Monroe made it clear that a fed-
eral case is still possible even though the injuries inflicted are also
covered by state tort or criminal law: Even if the thirteen Chicago
police officers who broke into Mr. Monroe's home could be held lia-
ble under state law for trespass, false imprisonment, assault and bat-
tery, the federal remedy is still available.' 6 Overlap between
constitutional and ordinary tort is therefore the norm rather than the
exception in § 1983.
Of course, the other side to the dialogue between federal and
state law is federalism. Because § 1983 litigation by definition consti-
tutes a federal intrusion on the state sphere, the limits imposed by
federalism are important. Historians may disagree over the extent of
intrusion contemplated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
school officials win [on sufficient custody to impose drug testing] and tails the child loses [on
sufficient custody to warrant protection]." Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Drug Test-
ing: The Impact of Acton, 33 Am. ClM. L. REV. 349, 375 (1996).
13. See Oren, DeShaney in Context, supra note 12, at 662-63, 683.
14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (overruling Monroe's holding that cities were not subject to § 1983 liability).
15. Id. at 187; see Sheldon H. Nahmod, State Constitutional Torts: DeShaney, Re-
verse-Federalism and Community, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 949 (1995). Professor Nahmod observed
that the Justices have disagreed at times whether the common law which "informs" interpreta-
tion of statutory elements in § 1983 is the common law as it existed in 1871, or whether the Court
should take account of more recent tort developments. See Nahmod, supra at 956. Professor
Nahmod cites Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), in which the majority and the dissent debated
the prevailing punitive damages rules in existence in 1871, as well as whether those rules should
control current § 1983 punitive damages. On the other hand, in Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Court used a contemporary "tort concept of risk-spreading as a partial
justification for its holding that local governments are not protected" by qualified immunity from
§ 1983 damages. Professor Nahmod argues that this background of tort liability "gloss" on
§ 1983 demonstrates that "Congress and the federal courts are to learn from the states." See
Nahmod, supra at 956.
16. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
19971
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ment.17 The Court certainly has grappled with this debate.'8  We all
would agree, however, that there are outer limits: Section 1983 should
not take over the entire field of state law, even when the harm is in-
flicted by a state actor. This is so because § 1983 was meant to vindi-
cate federal interests, not simply provide another arena for the pursuit
of state tort claims. Section 1983 jurisprudence, therefore, is both an
exercise in line-drawing as well as in dialogue.
Three issues were in dispute in Doe v. Taylor. The first contro-
versy which divided the Taylor court was whether the school girl had a
constitutionally-protected "liberty interest" at all.19 This question is
important because § 1983 creates no rights itself. Rather, it merely
enforces rights derived either from the Constitution of the United
States or from other sources of federal law.20 Jane Doe sought a rem-
edy for the loss of her right to substantive due process under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. That provision prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.21 But in order to qualify for this
protection, Doe had to establish a triggering interest, in this case her
claim that she had a liberty interest in freedom from arbitrary intru-
sions by governmental agents on her bodily integrity.22 This Article
contends that, because of what I call the "Ingraham dilemma," Jane
Doe clearly suffered a substantive due process deprivation. As a re-
sult, the dissent was forced to resort to desperate measures to deny
the validity of her claim.
17. For a discussion of the historical background, see Laura Oren, Immunity and Accounta-
bility in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 935, 939 n.18 (1989). See
also Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights
after the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 47 (1987) (discussing the various schools of historical
thinking and taking the anti-revisionist position that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act represented a "revolutionary change in American constitutionalism").
18. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (The concept of "Our Federalism"
does not mean "blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of
control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts.").
19. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 1994); id. at 476 (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
20. See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977), which recognized that due process
claims entailed a "familiar two-stage analysis"-first ascertaining whether a liberty interest was
implicated, and then determining what process was due to protect any such interest. It is clear
that the two-stage analysis applies to claims of substantive due process violations as well. See
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). In Washington, the Court first acknowledged that
prison inmates had a liberty interest in remaining free from unconsented medication with
psychotropic drugs. Id. at 222. Having found the triggering interest, the Court then engaged in
separate substantive and procedural inquiries to determine whether the state's justification was
substantively sufficient, and whether the procedures followed satisfied procedural due process.
See id. at 220-27 (substantive due process analysis), 228-33 (procedural due process analysis).
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The second issue was raised by a dissenting strategy to escape
finding the constitutional violation: they engaged in a sub silentio and
inappropriate attempt to import common law "scope of employment"
doctrine into the unique § 1983 concept of action committed under
"color of state law." Section 1983 requires that the defendant have
acted under color of state law, a statutory element that closely resem-
bles, but is not identical to, the constitutional concept of "state ac-
tion."' 23 Since Monroe v. Pape, the Court's federal law interpretation
of "under color of state law" has transformed a little-used Reconstruc-
tion-era statute into the major vehicle for enforcing constitutional
rights today. This Article contends that common law "scope of em-
ployment" doctrine has no legitimate place in. § 1983 "color of law"
jurisprudence and can only serve to undermine the central insights of
Monroe.
The third issue provides the most interesting opportunity for dia-
logue between § 1983 and the background of tort liability. The statute
grants a remedy against a defendant who "subjects or causes to be
subjected" anyone to a deprivation of federally guaranteed rights. 24
The Court has interpreted this language to require personal fault of
each defendant. 25 Therefore, the statute precludes vicarious liability,
or respondeat superior, which is permitted and even favored in the
contemporary common law. 26 While conceding that this is a settled
issue under § 1983,27 this Article contends nonetheless that the back-
ground of tort liability should be considered in determining which in-
dividual defendants may be held liable for the constitutional injury in
the teacher sex abuse cases. The lower courts have erred in applying
23. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
25. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978) (citing Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1975)); see also infra note 250 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 225-260 and accompanying text.
27. But see St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 148 n.1 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Stevens criticizes the Court's decision to exclude respondeat superior from its interpretation of
§ 1983 and to limit municipal liability in that way. See also Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants:
The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Cr. REv. 281,
359-60. Professor Schuck was critical of the decision in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622 (1980), which imposed liability on the city for a "discretionary" decision. See Schuck, supra
Generally, however, he favors a contraction of liability for the official coupled with legislation
which would impose vicarious liability on the municipality instead. See id. at 360-61. Professor
Schuck believes that congressional action is necessary to achieve this change because of the
limitations inherent in Monell. See id. at 359. In 1978, before Monell was decided, Judge Jon 0.
Newman argued that § 1983 reached the wrong defendant when it focused on the employee
instead of the employing government. See Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447,
455-58 (1978). Judge Newman also supported congressional action to permit vicarious liability
against municipal and state governments. See id. at 457-58.
1997]
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to individual liability for the failure to supervise the standard of "de-
liberate indifference," a formulation developed in City of Canton v.
Harris28 in the different context of municipal liability. Instead, the
lower courts should consider "notice liability," an approach known to
the common law, but which also incorporates the § 1983 requirement
of personal responsibility.
The fact that these issues arise in cases that are about children,
schools, and sex is of more than incidental significance. It explains
some of the odder arguments against liability. It also underpins my
own analysis of the abuse of state power that occurs when a supervi-
sory official is responsible for a subordinate's sexual abuse of a child
in school.
LINE-DRAWING AND THE UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT:
OF "LIBERTY" AND THE INGRAHAM DILEMMA
Jane Doe sued two supervisors.29 The school principal, Eddy
Lankford, had received notice of Coach Stroud's inappropriate behav-
ior with female students as early as the fall of 1985.30 Rumors circu-
lated in school and around town about the teacher's overt favoritism
toward girl students in the classroom. 31 Parents and teachers com-
plained in the Fall of 1985 and the Spring of 1986.32 A school librarian
witnessed an incident which she considered child molestation and
which she reported to Lankford.33 This and other behavior, all of
which occurred before the coach began his pursuit of Jane Doe,
brought little reaction from the principal.34 Indeed, he downplayed
the incidents and did not warn or discipline the coach in any way or
even bother to document the complaints. 35 After Jane Doe entered
the school, the principal further received notice that Stroud had
targeted her in particular for his sexual attentions and abuse.36 In
"the most striking example of his apathy," however, the principal did
nothing even when another student showed him a revealing valentine
addressed by the coach to Doe.37 Instead of discussing the incident
28. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
29. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1994).
30. See id. at 446.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 446-47.




37. Id. at 448.
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with Stroud, Superintendent Caplinger, or the girl's parents, or pro-
tecting Doe in any way, he transferred out of Stroud's class the other
student, the one who brought to his attention the inappropriately inti-
mate correspondence. 38 Some time after this, the coach's escalating
sexual abuse of Doe culminated in intercourse. 39
Defendant Mike Caplinger became superintendent of the District
in July of 1986.40 According to the summary judgment evidence, he
heard nothing about the coach's inappropriate behavior with female
students until January of 1987 when, for the first time, the principal
notified him about complaints from other students.41 He instructed
Lankford to speak to Stroud.42 After complaints from parents, Cap-
linger spoke to the school attorney and had the principal contact the
Texas Education Agency to find out if there were any other com-
plaints against the teacher. 43 Six months later, in July of 1987, Doe's
parents discovered photographs with a revealing personal inscription
from the coach to the girl." When confronted, the girl denied a sex-
ual involvement with Stroud.45 Caplinger called the principal who in
turn spoke to the coach, who also denied anything improper.46 For
the first time, Lankford warned of disciplinary consequences. 47 The
superintendent and the principal met with the coach and warned him
that he should stay away from the girl.48 But no further action was
taken and no greater care was exercised for the rest of the school
year.49 Stroud stayed away from Doe for a while, but when school
resumed in the late summer, the sexual abuse also began again.50 It
was only halted after Doe's parents found more love letters and took
their daughter to their family attorney.5 1 She admitted the truth to
him.52 On the same day the attorney reported this to the superinten-
dent, Caplinger also received a complaint from the parents of another
child.53 He ordered Stroud immediately suspended from employ-
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 447.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 448.
43. See id. at 448-49.












ment.5 4 The coach subsequently pled guilty to criminal charges stem-
ming from his molestation of Jane Doe.
55
Is there a federal interest at stake in this scenario? The Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that there is a well-established right under the Fourteenth
Amendment "to be free of state-occasioned damage to a person's
bodily integrity. ' 56 In his majority opinion in Taylor, Judge Jolly ob-
served that the Fifth Circuit recognized the liberty interest in bodily
integrity in a 1981 case in which a New Orleans police officer night-
sticked a tourist who was trying to take a picture of an arrest during
Mardi Gras.5 7 The same court applied this principle in another case,
Jefferson v. Ysleta Independent School District,58 in which a school
teacher tied a second-grader to a chair for almost two full school days,
even denying the child access to the bathroom.5 9 A final case, Judge
Jolly noted, "held that the infliction of corporal punishment in public
schools is a deprivation of substantive due process when it is arbitrary,
capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of main-
taining an atmosphere conducive to learning. '60 Considering all these
rulings, Judge Jolly concluded that Taylor was an easy case:
54. See id.
55. See id
56. Id at 450.
57. Id. at 451 (citing Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981)).
58. 817 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. See id. at 305. In Jefferson, the teacher's purpose was neither punishment nor discipline,
but apparently was intended as an educational exercise. See id. at 304. As a result, the Fifth
Circuit found that Jefferson was not controlled by the results in cases where discipline was in-
tended, such as Ingraham v. Wright, 439 U.S. 651 (1977), "and its progeny." Id. at 305.
60. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 451 (citing Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1984))) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
In Fee, a Fifth Circuit panel held that there was no substantive due process violation arising
out of an allegedly severe paddling of a sixth-grade special-education student. See Fee, 900 F.2d
at 806. The parents claimed that the child was so severely traumatized as a result of the paddling
that he required six months of psychiatric hospitalization. See id. at 807. The defendants
claimed that the parents had consented to the use of corporal punishment, and that any injury
was due to the child's thrashing around under the three paddles. See id. at 806. The parents
admitted that the child's emotional problems predated the punishment. See id. at 807. The court
quoted Woodard for the proposition that reasonable corporal punishment does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 808. The Fee court considered dispositive Cunningham v.
Beavers, 858 F.2d 269 (5th Cir, 1988). Cunningham upheld punishment administered to a six-
year-old on the basis that so long as adequate criminal and tort remedies existed for any exces-
sive corporal punishment, no substantive due process violation could be established. Id. at 272.
The Fee decision suggested that under Cunningham, students' recourse for excessive paddling
might be restricted to state courts. See Fee, 900 F.2d at 809.
The student also lost in Woodard, in which three punitive swats given to a high school stu-
dent at her request in lieu of suspension (but contrary to her parents' instructions) was held to
give rise to at most a procedural complaint. Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d
1243, 1244 (5th Cir. 1984). The court observed that the Fifth Circuit had held after remand of
[Vol. 72:747
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If the Constitution protects a schoolchild against being tied to a
chair or against arbitrary paddlings, then surely the Constitution
protects a schoolchild from physical sexual abuse-here, sexually
fondling a fifteen-year old [sic] school girl and statutory rape-by a
public schoolteacher. Stroud's sexual abuse of Jane Doe ... is not
contested by the defendants. Thus, Jane Doe clearly was deprived
of a liberty interest recognized under the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
1
The Taylor majority's examination of the liberty interest at stake
did not go much further than this. But the Fifth Circuit's response to
Jane Doe's claims clearly is related to what I call "the Ingraham di-
lemma." That difficulty arises because of the similarity, on the one
hand, and the difference, on the other, between corporal punishment
in the schools and sexual abuse by teachers. In Ingraham v. Wright,62
the Supreme Court recognized that paddling infringed a school child's
"liberty interest. ' 63 Likewise, Judge Jolly wrote in Taylor, "[i]t is in-
controvertible that bodily integrity is necessarily violated when a state
actor sexually abuses a schoolchild and that such misconduct deprives
the child of rights vouchsafed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 64 Un-
like the Ingraham situation, however, the Fifth Circuit could discern
no educational purpose for sexual abuse. Judge Jolly observed that
"there is never any justification for sexually molesting a schoolchild,
Ingraham that it was not going to examine individual instances of corporal punishment to see
whether they conformed with substantive due process. See id. at 1246 & n.12.
61. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 451.
62. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
63. See id. at 672. Justice Powell's opinion in Ingraham applied the "familiar two-stage
analysis" to the schoolchildren's procedural due process claim: "We must first ask whether the
asserted individual interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
'life, liberty or property'; if protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what proce-
dures constitute 'due process of law."' Id.
Ingraham reiterated that not all interests trigger due process protection. See id. at 672-73.
Rather, it is the nature of the interest and not its weight which "'determine[s] whether due pro-
cess requirements apply in the first place."' Id. at 672 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)). The particular interest at stake in Ingraham, however, constituted a
triggering interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 673-74. In the Court's words,
"[almong the historic liberties so protected [from deprivation without due process] was a right to
be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security." Id. at
673. This historic liberty interest always was "thought to encompass freedom from bodily re-
straint and punishment." Id. at 673-74. As a consequence, where school authorities, acting
under color of state law, "deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the
child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
ests are implicated." Id. at 674.
Despite finding that constitutional interest, however, the Court also ruled that existing state
procedures satisfied procedural due process and that notice and a hearing prior to imposition of
corporal punishment in the public schools was not necessary. See id. at 682.
64. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 451-52. For a collection of cases that likewise have extended the
liberty interest recognized in Ingraham to include sexual abuse of students, see Plumeau v.
Yamhill County Sch. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 1423, 1435 (D. Or. 1995).
1997]
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and thus, no state interest, analogous to the punitive and disciplinary
objectives attendant to corporal punishment, which might support
it."65
This complete absence of any justification for a teacher's sexual
abuse of a school child creates the Ingraham dilemma. Two Ingraham
opinions contributed to this result: one in the Fifth Circuit and one in
the Supreme Court.66 The Supreme Court granted certiorari only on
the Eighth Amendment and procedural due process challenges to a
Florida statute authorizing corporal punishment in schools.67 The
plaintiffs, however, also alleged that corporal punishment violated
substantive due process because it was necessarily unjustified and thus
arbitrary and capricious governmental action. 68 That claim never
made it to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, on the other hand, ruled that corporal punishment was an ac-
ceptable "means used to achieve an atmosphere which facilitates the
effective transmittal of knowledge. ' '69 Paddling did not lack a "real
and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained" and thus
passed the minimal substantive due process test: "Only if the regula-
tion bears no reasonable relation to the legitimate end of maintaining
an atmosphere conducive to learning can it be held to violate the sub-
stantive provision of the due process laws."' 70 The court of appeals
also declined to review each individual incident of corporal punish-
ment to determine whether the discipline had been administered ap-
propriately or arbitrarily in that case-noting instead that a remedy
was available in state court.71
The Fifth Circuit's elegant Ingraham solution may "[bar and bolt]
the federal courthouse door to individual students subjected to exces-
sive corporal punishment by public school teachers," 72 but it does not
65. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 452; see Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 681-82, for the disciplinary objectives
of corporal punishment.
66. See Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
67. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653, 659.
68. See Ingraham, 525 F.2d at 915.
69. Id. at 917.
70. Id.
71. See id. The dissent, on the other hand, criticized the idea that regardless of how severe
or excessive the corporal punishment, the court would refuse substantive due process review.
See id. at 925-26 (Rives, J. dissenting). The minority believed that the majority position effec-
tively treated lickings that were more severe than those allowed by the statute as acts not done
under color of state law. See id. at 925. In the dissent's view, this contravened the meaning of
Monroe. See id. at 925-26. The dissidents further observed that there was a widespread failure
to adhere to the paddling policy guidelines in the Florida schools. See id. at 926.
72. Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due
Process Protection Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 Hous. L.
REv. 399, 400 (1990).
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destroy a federal claim based on sexual abuse by school teachers.
Judge Jolly himself was on the panel that declined to review individual
instances of egregious corporal punishment. 73 Nevertheless, he found
it easy to pen the opinion in Doe v. Taylor.
The absolute absence of justification creates a problem for the
Taylor dissenters. The Supreme Court's Ingraham decision recognizes
an "historic liberty interest" in freedom from "unjustified intrusions
on [a school child's] personal security."' 74 On the other hand, the dis-
senters cannot rely on the Fifth Circuit's Ingraham opinion to elimi-
nate a case the minority apparently does not view as any more than an
ordinary tort. Nor can they rely on DeShaney, that other bulwark
against public responsibility. Jane Doe confined her suit against the
principal and superintendent to § 1983 supervisory liability.75 She did
not rely on any claim that the defendants had a constitutional duty to
protect her from the predations of Coach Stroud.76
So why did the dissenters not see a federal case in Jane Doe's
situation? 77 It has something to do with a general unhappiness with
the constitutional jurisprudence of "fundamental rights," and it has
something to do with sex. In her dissent Judge Jones conflated Jane
Doe's significantly different claim with complaints implicating funda-
73. See Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1988).
74. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
75. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994).
76. See id. The majority conceded that if the lawsuit against the principal and the superin-
tendent were based on some constitutional duty to protect, DeShaney would be relevant. See id.
Judge Jolly noted, however, that even Jane Doe herself disavowed any such claim. See id. In-
stead, the lawsuit was founded on supervisory liability for the misconduct of a subordinate
teacher. See id. at 451 n.3, 452. The coach who affirmatively injured Jane Doe was a state actor.
See id. at 452 n.4. As a result, it was immaterial whether compulsory school attendance laws
created a "duty to protect." See id. at 451 n.3. It did not matter whether the teacher stood in a
"special relationship" to the school child as a result of some restraint of her liberty by the state.
See id. He had no right to violate her due process rights by his own actions. See id.
See also Clark v. Donahue, 885 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (state hospital has duty
to protect even voluntary patients from harm inflicted by state actors); K.L. v. Southeast Delco
Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1192, 1195 & n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (school district has affirmative duty to
protect students from sexual abuse by teachers); C.M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp.
1179, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (school district has duty to protect from teachers even though no
special relationship is found). But see Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 711-14 (3d
Cir. 1993) (finding no special relationship that requires school superintendent to protect children
sexually abused by school bus driver); Doe v. Douglas City Sch. Dist. RE-i, 770 F. Supp. 591,
593-94 (D. Colo. 1991) (finding no "special relationship" between public schools and students
that requires school officials to protect students from sexual abuse by school psychologist).
77. See Doe, 15 F.3d at 465 (Garwood, J., dissenting); id. at 475 (Jones, J., dissenting); id. at
479 (Garza, J., dissenting). All six dissenters joined the opinions by Judges Garwood and Jones.




mental liberties.78 This (con)fusion allowed her to tap a vein of hostil-
ity to the creation of new fundamental rights.79 Referencing Daniels
v. Williams80 by implication, and Paul v. Davis8l expressly, Judge
Jones writes that "it is not obvious why this 'right' [not to be seduced
by her teacher] should be more 'fundamental' than Doe's right to her
reputation or her right not to be negligently run over by a state em-
ployee, neither of which enjoys constitutional protection." 82 In both
of those cases, however, fundamentality was not the defect which pre-
cluded a finding of a constitutional violation. In Daniels, the Court
found no Fourteenth Amendment deprivation where a pillow left on
the stairs of a prison caused an inmate to slip and fall and be injured.8 3
In a companion case, Davidson v. Cannon,8 4 the Court similarly held
that negligence in preventing an assault on an inmate could not violate
78. See, e.g., id. at 476 n.2 (debating the view of Judge Higginbotham's concurrence that
Doe's "fundamental right" was implicated); id. at 478 n.6 (listing the few cases since 1977 in
which rights have been found to be "fundamental, and therefore, worthy of strict judicial scru-
tiny" and contrasting the long list of cases in which the Court has "rejected novel fundamental
rights claims"). Judge Higginbotham's concurrence slips into the same error of confusing all
liberty interests with fundamental liberty interests. See id at 460 (Higginbotham, J., concurring)
(citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)) ("The deeper the mark of disapproval
that state and federal civil and criminal law have placed on Stroud's acts, the stronger the case
that Doe's liberty interest is fundamental."); see also Taylor, 15 F.3d at 461 (Higginbotham, J.,
concurring) (misciting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672) ("Only after we have recognized a fundamen-
tal liberty interest do we look to state law to see if an infringement of that interest has occurred
without due process."). Ingraham actually says:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Application of this prohibition requires the familiar
two-stage analysis: We must first ask whether the asserted individual interests are en-
compassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'life, liberty or property';
if protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what procedures constitute
'due process of law' . . . Due process is required only when a decision of the State
implicates an interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
430 U.S. at 672.
79. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992)) ("The Court has also recently
expressed a strong reluctance to find new fundamental rights.").
Fundamental rights are those that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
These are the ones that are eligible for heightened judicial protection. See also Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (fundamental liberties are those deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition).
80. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
81. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
82. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 479 (Jones, J. dissenting). Judge Jones apparently equates the claim
recognized by the Taylor majority with the unsuccessful argument in Michael H. that a biological
father has a fundamental liberty interest in establishing his relationship to his child, born during
the mother's marriage to another man. See id. (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122) ("The
majority apparently believe that Doe's substantive due process right to 'bodily integrity' is self-
evidently 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."').
83. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
84. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
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the Constitution.85 In each case, the Court essentially conceded that a
liberty interest in personal security was at stake, but nonetheless ruled
that the injury failed to rise to a constitutional level because mere
negligence cannot violate the Fourteenth Amendment.86
It is true that the Supreme Court declined to find any triggering
liberty interest in Paul v. Davis,87 a suit brought by a man whose name
was included in a police flyer listing "active shoplifters" which was
circulated to merchants. 88 The Court ruled in Davis that the defama-
tion alone, the injury to the plaintiff's reputation, was neither "liberty"
nor "property" and, therefore, failed to merit any level of protection
under the Due Process Clause.8 9 On the other hand, "stigma plus"
does implicate a protected liberty interest. 90 If some further damage
such as the loss of a job is added to the defamatory statement, due
process is required.91 Clearly, stigma plus is no more fundamental
than stigma, but it is a federally recognized liberty interest and not just
a state-protected right. Once the claim is recognized as involving a
triggering liberty interest, due process applies.92
Similarly, there are other liberty interests to which the Court af-
fords some protection even though they are not "fundamental.
'93
85. See Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347-48.
86. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347. Michael Wells observes in this
issue that no objection was raised in Daniels to the claim that a physical injury constitutes a loss
of liberty. See Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of
Law, 72 CJi.-KENr L. REV. 632 n.84 (1997). Furthermore, Wells notes that in DeShaney v.
Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989), the Supreme Court evinced no disap-
proval of Ingraham's ruling that personal security was a liberty interest. See id. Finally, although
the Court denied relief in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992), it again
implicitly recognized that personal security against physical injury is an aspect of liberty. See id
at 1069 & n.10.
87. 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
88. See id at 712.
89. See id. For a criticism of the Paul Court's more narrow interpretation of liberty than its
precedents, see Wells, supra note 86.
90. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09.
91. See id.
92. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
93. See Wells, supra note 86, at 633 n.90 (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and
"Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 413-14 (1977): Although the Court turned its back on the
economic due process doctrine of the Lochner era, it has not abandoned the original expansive
definition of "liberty" asserted therein.).
Recently, in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995), the Supreme Court significantly rede-
fined the circumstances under which liberty interests may be created by state law. The majority
was dissatisfied with the results of Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), which had ruled that
mandatory state prison regulations created protected liberty interests in inmates. See Sandin,
115 S. Ct. at 2299-300. The Sandin Court blamed this ruling for creating endless inmate litigation
over any prison regulation with nondiscretionary language which therefore was held to create a
liberty interest. See id. at 2300. In Sandin, the Court confined state-law-created liberty interests
to those relating to "freedom from restraint, which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force [like
1997]
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Premier among them is the "historic" interest in freedom from "unjus-
tified intrusions on personal security" recognized in Ingraham.94 It is
neither necessary to defend this as a "fundamental" right95 in order to
garner some substantive protection nor useful to attack this liberty
interest for failing to reach those rarefied heights. 96
Admittedly, as Michael Wells discusses elsewhere in this issue,
the Court's decisions sometimes obscure the basis for line-drawing
between constitutional and nonconstitutional interests.97 The plural-
ity opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,98 on which Judge Jones relied
Vitek, or Harper] nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life." lI. From both sides of the Sandin opinion, and in the
cases cited therein, it is clear that there are liberty interests of differing weights: some are funda-
mental, but many others are not. Albeit narrowing the definition of liberty, the majority ruling
nonetheless continues to leave room for a category of liberty interest which is not even derived
directly from the Constitution, much less as a "fundamental" right. See i. Justice Ginsburg,
who dissented in Sandin in part because she thought the prison regulation violation at issue in
that case could in fact be derived directly from the Due Process Clause, nonetheless did not
claim that the liberty at stake was "fundamental." See id. at 2302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Cases cited in Sandin recognized a number of prison-regulation-related liberty interests, none of
which were held to be "fundamental." See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22
(1990) (not deciding whether an inmate's liberty interest in being protected from involuntary
administration of psychotropic drugs is fundamental); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980)
(prisoner transferred involuntarily to a state mental hospital for treatment of a mental disease or
defect has liberty interest to be free of such transfer because of the stigmatizing consequences);
On Harper, see Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and State
Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 48, 53 n.302 (1991).
94. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977); see also Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492 (recogniz-
ing that compelled treatment in a behavior modification program implicates the liberty interest
in freedom from unjustified intrusions on personal security). In Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300, the
Court characterized Ingraham as concerning "the rights of schoolchildren to remain free from
arbitrary corporal punishment." "Although children sent to public school are lawfully confined
to the classroom, arbitrary corporal punishment represents an invasion of personal security to
which their parents do not consent when entrusting the educational mission to the State." Id.
(citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674). Elsewhere in this issue, Michael Wells contends that the
Ingraham ruling about personal security from physical pain reaches far beyond corporal punish-
ment cases, to become the basis for a general rule that physical injury caused by government
may constitute a deprivation of liberty that supports a constitutional tort claim, at least in proce-
dural due process cases. See Wells, supra note 86, at 632 n.84 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (right to safe conditions of confinement in state mental hospital); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (same); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (liberty interest
in physical injury not disputed, but mere negligence held not to violate the Due Process Clause);
DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (recognizing personal
security from physical injury as an aspect of liberty); and Collins v. Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct.
1061, 1069 & n.10. (1992) (recognizing personal security from physical injury as an aspect of
liberty)). Professor Wells further argues that a more general theory of substantive due process
may be constructed from the liberty interest recognized in Ingraham. See Wells, supra note 86,
at 634.
95. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1994) (Higginbotham,
J., concurring).
96. See id. at 479 (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122
(1989)).
97. See Wells, supra note 86, at 638-40.
98. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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in part in Taylor, for example, maintained that the Due Process Clause
affords substantive protection only to liberties "so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '"99
As Justice Scalia implicitly acknowledged elsewhere, however, it is
more accurate to say that since 1937, in deference to the legislature,
substantive review is only cursory unless the liberty involved is held to
be fundamental. 100 As discussed above, and in contrast to Michael H.,
Jane Doe does not require heightened scrutiny in order to prevail on
her claim of entirely arbitrary conduct by school officials. The funda-
mental rights cases therefore offer no way out of the Ingraham
dilemma.
OF LIBERTY AND SEX
The dissenters in Doe v. Taylor had another (perhaps more tell-
ing) problem with the liberty interest recognized by the majority. Dis-
99. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934));
see also Taylor, 15 F.3d at 479 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("The majority apparently believe that
Doe's substantive due process right to 'bodily integrity' is self-evidently 'so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."').
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and in
part by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. The latter two Justices demurred from footnote 6 in
which Scalia further required the "liberty" which merited substantive protection to be formu-
lated at the most specific possible level. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). In Michael H., the Justices not only disagreed about how to derive fundamental liberties,
but they even disputed whether the case involved a substantive claim at all rather than a proce-
dural challenge alone. See id. at 136. Justice Brennan's dissent reasoned that there was a suffi-
cient liberty interest in the relationship between the child and her putative father sufficient to
merit a procedural hearing on whether he was her biological parent. See id. at 148 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The state rule violated due process because it conclusively presumed that the
mother's husband was the father of the child and gave the putative father no opportunity to be
heard. See id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, on the other
hand, characterized the attack on the conclusive presumption as substantive, a challenge to the
fit between the classification and the policy that the classification serves. See id. at 121. Having
defined the claim as substantive due process, Justice Scalia then barred relief unless a fundamen-
tal liberty interest was at stake, that interest to be rooted in history and tradition and defined at
its most specific level. See id. at 122-23. In the absence of any tradition affording unmarried
adulterous fathers protection in their relationship to the children they begat on married women,
he concluded that there was no substantive protection at all. See id. at 125-27. To say that the
Due Process Clause affords substantive protection only to the subcategory of liberty interests
called "fundamental," however, is to confuse degrees of protection with whether there is any
coverage at all.
100. See Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447-49 (1993) (infringement of "fundamental"
liberty impermissible unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest, see id. at 1447; impairment of a lesser interest demands "no more than a 'reasonable fit'
between governmental purpose ... and the means chosen to advance that purpose," id. at 1448-
49; infringement of a nonfundamental interest must "still meet the (unexacting) standard of ra-
tionally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose....", id. at 1449). Flores upheld INS
regulations that permitted the agency to retain alien minors in custody instead of releasing them
to responsible adults. For post-1937 reasonableness review, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONST-
TUTIONAL LAW 391-92 (5th ed. 1995).
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sents by Judges Jones and Garwood emphasized what they
characterized as the "consensual" nature of the sex that the teacher
extracted from his fifteen-year-old student.101 The way Judge Jones
formulated Jane Doe's claim is revealing: She described it as "Doe's
'right' not to be seduced by her teacher."'01 2 This language suggests
that, in Jones' opinion, the problem was sex. Even more revealing,
Judge Garwood criticized what he thought was an unduly broad defi-
nition of "physical sexual abuse" by a school employee. 0 3 He would
agree only that where a child is "sufficiently immature," "consensual
sexual relations or fondling, of private parts by an adult constitutes
physical sexual abuse."'1 4 But, he says, for that also to be actionable
under § 1983, the child must be young enough, and the abuse must be
"under color of state law."' 0 5 Judge Garwood was not convinced that
it was clearly established in 1987 that age fifteen is "per se, sufficiently
immature."' Why not? Almost sheepishly, he explained that Jane
Doe was old enough to bear children! 0 7
The fact that the teacher's intrusion on the student's bodily integ-
rity took the form of sex should not remove it from the circle of con-
stitutional protection. To the contrary, it is the abuse of power that
characterizes sexual imposition of this kind, which demonstrates even
more clearly that Coach Stroud deprived Jane Doe of her liberty. This
teacher was a habitual sexual harasser. 08 It was no coincidence that
this forty-year-old man picked on a fourteen-year-old freshman girl.
Stroud already had a reputation for being "too friendly," in the words
of the principal who failed to intervene, with other students like Jane
Doe.10 9 The administration was aware of complaints that the coach
101. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,467-68 & n.5 (Garwood, J., dissenting),
479 & n.8 (Jones, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 479 (Jones, J., dissenting).




107. See id. at 468. He observed that the common law set different ages of consent for statu-
tory rape and marriage, varying from 10 to 18 years old. See id. at 467 n.5.
108. See id. at 446, 448 (detailing his relationships with other students). The Texas Monthly
reported that Coach Stroud was a popular teacher who at the beginning of each year "liked to
pick out a few pretty girls and make them his teacher's pets." The article continued:
The girls were allowed to grade the class's test papers and put whatever mark they
wished in Stroud's grade book. They didn't have to do their homework, and they could
walk out of class and go to the rest room whenever they wanted. If they wanted a tardy
pass so they could be late to another class, he'd write it for them. Meanwhile, Stroud
would make the wallflower girls and the boys-well, at least those who weren't stars on
the football team-do all the assigned work.
Skip Hollandsworth, The Seduction of Jane Doe, TExAs MoNThLY, Nov. 1995, at 118.
109. See Taylor, 15 F.3d at 446.
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had an inappropriate relationship with a freshman girl in 1984-85.11o
When that girl became a sophomore, however, Stroud focused his at-
tention on a new freshman."' The next year, Jane Doe entered the
school, found herself in the teacher's biology class, and became his
next young target.112 He intentionally misused his access to and
power and authority over school girls to give favors and to cultivate
trust and dependence."13 He pressed his sexual advances on a girl
who was in his charge by virtue of his school-teacher role. As is often
the case, he targeted a freshman for his sexual importunings and pur-
sued her with his friendship, favoritism, and escalating sexual pressure
until she finally stopped saying no to complete intercourse.114 Even-
tually, she yielded and he prevailed. That he did not have to assault




112. See id. at 447.
113. See id. at 446-47.
114. See id. at 447-48. The facts alleged in this case give a sense of the mixture of favors,
attention, and threats that a teacher may wield in his campaign to obtain sex from a young
student: The popular coach walked Doe to class and took her out of school with her friends
during the day, buying them alcoholic beverages. See id. at 447. He did not require her to do
classwork or take tests, and rewarded her with high grades. See id. He took her out of other
classes to be alone with him in his room. See id. He wrote her flattering notes and swore her to
secrecy. See Hollandsworth, supra note 108, at 135. Doe stated in an affidavit that she never
told the teacher "'No' because I just did not know what to say and I was scared. If I told him
'No' I really did not know what he would do. I guess I throught [sic] Coach Stroud would just
turn on me completely. Coach Stroud did tell me that if anyone knew about us that he could
loose [sic] his job, family." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at C-14, Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch.
Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-908).
See also Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996). The sexual abuse began
when the girl was a fourteen-year-old freshman. See id. at 501. After the first time the teacher
reached into her blouse and fondled her breasts, the girl avoided him for the rest of the school
year. See id. But the following year, he pursued her with harassing phone calls and offers to let
her be scorekeeper for his team. See id. When she acceded to that "favor," he touched her
again. See id. He escalated his phone calls and pressure in school and out, and finally had
intercourse with the student. See id. The girl never reported the ongoing abuse to anyone and it
continued until the teacher was caught. See id.
115. See Taylor, 15 F.3d at 475 (Jones, J., dissenting); cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (Title IX action brought by high school student seeking damages for
alleged sexual harassment and abuse by coach-teacher). The teacher in Franklin similarly was a
habitual harasser who actively pursued a student until she fell prey to his campaign. Beginning
in her 10th grade year, the coach and teacher began "continual sexual harassment" of the stu-
dent. See id. at 63. He engaged her in sexually oriented conversations; asked whether she would
consider having a relationship with an older man; telephoned her at home; and persisted until
culmination in what the Supreme Court called coercive intercourse. See id. The court of appeals
described the course of events as follows: The teacher befriended the girl; he allowed her to
grade class papers; he called her out to private meetings during and between classes; he gave her
notes to excuse her from attendance in other classes; and he initiated conversations of a sexual
nature. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503
U.S. 60 (1992). When the teacher grabbed the girl and kissed her in the parking lot, the student
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In other contexts, courts have found that the coerced imposition
of sex by a state actor who possesses law-enforcement power over the
victim is a violation of constitutional rights. The Fifth Circuit recently
affirmed a judgment against a sheriff who raped a woman suspected in
a murder he was investigating."16 Appellate courts generally uphold
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 242, which criminally punishes any-
one who, under color of law, willfully subjects any person to a de-
privation of federally-guaranteed rights.117 In United States v.
was admonished. See id. Other female students complained to a school counselor that the
teacher was directing sexual remarks at them too. See id. Ultimately, several instances of inter-
course with the plaintiff schoolgirl occurred on campus. See id. When the principal was told,
that official allegedly tried to discourage the student from making a complaint that would attract
negative publicity. See id. In the end, there was an investigation, the teacher resigned, and the
principal retired. See id. at 619.
116. See Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 68 (1996).
After shooting her husband in the midst of a violent domestic dispute, the woman had turned
herself in, made a statement, and then was released from custody. See id. at 583. The sheriff
went to her home and invaded her bedroom, where he threatened her with his power as a law
enforcement officer in order to gain her compliance. See id. He unsuccessfully argued that they
talked and she gave only token resistance to his request for sex, willingly entering the house with
him. See id. at 584. She testified that she found him standing over her bed naked and that he
told her that he was the sheriff, he could do anything, he could have her tossed into jail, and it
would only be sorted out later. See iL at 583.
Compare equal protection to these due process claims. Courts have held that sexual harass-
ment of female employees by state defendants may constitute sex discrimination in employment
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bohen v.
City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) (following the equal protection analysis
under the Fifth Amendment in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979)); Saulpaugh v.
Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993); Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d
251 (2d Cir. 1994) (harassment has to be more than merely boorish for an equal protection
violation to be stated); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989); Pontarelli v. Stone,
930 F.2d 104, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1991); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1994).
117. See United States v. Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 1996) (police officer used the threat
of arrest to coerce five suspected prostitutes to engage in various sexual acts with him).
Although the convictions were reversed on other grounds, Judge Edith Jones' opinion raised no
question that the allegations would be sufficient to support a criminal indictment. In United
States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 235, 244 (5th Cir. 1991), the court upheld the conviction of an
on-duty police officer in Laredo who stopped a woman and when she could not produce citizen-
ship papers said he would take her to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but instead
removed her to an isolated place where he sexually assaulted her. She testified that his gun was
on the hood of the car during the incident and that she was afraid to disobey him or run away; he
claimed she consented to sex. See id. at 235. After the woman brought a complaint, the officer
made threats against her life. See id; see also United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1983) (border patrol charged with depriving illegal aliens of their liberty by coercing sexual fa-
vors from them).
But see United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1394 (6th Cir.) (en banc), rev'd and remanded,
117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997) (holding that after consideration of the legislative history of § 242, the case
law, the long established tradition of judicial restraint in the extension of criminal statutes, and
the lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute included within its cover-
age simple or sexual assault crimes, that the sexual harassment and assault indictment brought
under § 242 should have been dismissed).
18 U.S.C. § 242 provides in relevant part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
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Lanier,"8 the Supreme Court reversed the sole significant exception
to this consensus about the scope of § 242.119 The jury in Lanier had
convicted an influential Tennessee judge of misusing his power both as
a judicial officer and as an employer to coerce women sexually.
120
The trial court instructed the jury on the theory that the sexual as-
saults could be found to be interferences with bodily integrity that
shock the conscience, thereby violating the victims' substantive due
process rights. 121 A divided Sixth Circuit reversed because it found
that the right alleged was not specific enough to satisfy the strictures
of the federal criminal statute. 122 A strong dissent authored by Judge
Martha Craig Daughtrey, on the other hand, found that the right to be
free from rape and sexual assault and harassment easily fell within the
enforceable constitutional right to bodily integrity.123
As a criminal civil rights case, Lanier must satisfy the standard of
Screws v. United States.124 Although constitutional rights change and
evolve, in order to afford due process criminal statutes must give ade-
quate notice of the specific behavior that is prohibited.125 Conse-
quently, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court held in Screws that
§ 242 was constitutional only if it was interpreted to require specific
content for prosecutions alleging violations of due process rights. 126
The statute was saved because the Court found that the word "will-
fully" in the statute effectively required proof of "specific intent" to
purposefully violate protected rights.127 The defendant must have ac-
ted with the intent "to deprive a person of a right which has been
made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws
of the United States or by decisions interpreting them.' 28 This means
more than merely intending to do an act, but less than requiring the
defendant to be thinking in self-consciously constitutional terms. 129
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States .... shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section .. shall be fined...
or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1978).
118. 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).
119. See id. at 1224.
120. See Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1384.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1393-94.
123. See id at 1412-13 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
124. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
125. See id. at 95-96.
126. Id. at 95-100.
127. See id. at 101.
128. Id. at 103.
129. See id. at 106-07.
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Rather, this standard encompasses the acts of an official who willfully
continues to do acts which have been previously held to violate a con-
stitutional right. 130
In reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision in Lanier, the Supreme
Court held that the appellate court "used the wrong gauge" to deter-
mine whether the judge willfully violated rights which had been made
specific by previous decisions interpreting the constitutional right to
bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause.131 The Court
ruled that rights are made specific for the purposes of § 242 in the
same way that constitutional rights are found to be "clearly estab-
lished" for the purposes of the defense of qualified immunity under
the civil statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.132 After reversing on the grounds
of a mistaken definition of specific intent, the Supreme Court re-
manded Lanier to the Sixth Circuit, leaving it free to consider other
issues that might remain open.133
It is unclear how any ruling in Lanier on remand will influence
the Sixth Circuit's analysis of whether a liberty interest is implicated
when sex abuse goes to school. 134 An understanding of the dynamic
130. See id. at 104.
131. United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1228 (1997).
132. See id.
133. See id. The Court agreed that three issues raised by Kentucky were foreclosed on re-
mand. First, it rejected the argument that Screws somehow excludes from the ambit of § 242 any
rights deriving from the Due Process Clause. See id. at 1228 n.7. Second, the Court made it
clear that Lanier was not controlled by DeShaney v. Winnebago County of Social Services, 489
U.S. 189 (1989), which "generally limits the constitutional duty of officials to protect against
assault by private parties to cases where the victim is in custody." Id. But where the state
official is himself guilty of the assault, an argument based on the DeShaney custodial limit is
apparently "without merit." Id. Finally, the Court rejected the claim that all constitutional
claims relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise under either the Fourth or
Eighth Amendments and may never be considered "under the rubric of substantive due pro-
cess." Id. In delineating the closed issues, the Court kept silent about another issue not reached
in its decision-the argument that the sexual assaults were not taken "under color of state law":
"To the extent the issue remains open, we leave its consideration in the first instance to the
Court of Appeals on remand." Id. at 1224 n.2. Oral argument in Lanier suggested that the
Court might be divided on this critical issue. See Transcript of Oral Argument, U.S. v. Lanier
No. 95-1717, 1997 WL 7587 (U.S. Oral Arg.). For a discussion of the "under color of state law"
requirement incorporated into both § 242 and § 1983, the criminal and civil rights statutes re-
spectively, see infra notes 147-223 and accompanying text.
134. Even before the Supreme Court overturned its ruling, the Sixth Circuit itself apparently
did not feel that its own decision in Lanier determined the result in a civil § 1983 lawsuit arising
from a teacher's abuse of a student. In Doe v. Claiborne, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth
Circuit held that
a schoolchild's right to personal security and to bodily integrity manifestly embraces
the right to be free from sexual abuse at the hands of a public school employee. The
substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects students against abusive
governmental power as exercised by a school.... This conduct is so contrary to funda-
mental notions of liberty and so lacking of any redeeming social value, that no rational
individual could believe that sexual abuse by a state actor is constitutionally permissible
under the Due Process Clause.
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of sexual harassment, however, helps us decide that a teacher's "se-
duction" of a young student subject to his authority constitutes the
kind of abuse of state power that offends the Constitution. Experts on
sexual harassment in education teach that "sexual harassment is es-
sentially about the abuse of power in relationships."'1 35 Stated another
way, "[s]exual harassment involves manifestations of power or vio-
lence which use sexuality to control the behavior of others."'1 36
Neither flirtation nor seduction, sexual harassment is defined as "un-
welcome sexual attention that a victim is powerless to stop," a form of
aggression rather than sex.137 It is "almost always perpetrated by
males and typically directed against females.' 38 As a result, it also
constitutes sex discrimination, prohibited in the workplace under Title
VII and in schools under Title TX. 139 Insofar as intentional discrimi-
nation on the grounds of gender is established, such conduct by school
officials, of course, also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 40
Catherine MacKinnon first exposed sexual harassment in the
workplace as sex discrimination which exploited mutually reinforcing
systems of power in order to maintain a gender hierarchy and keep
women in their place.141 Sexual harassment on the job melds the sex-
ual power of males over females in our culture and the power of em-
ployers or supervisors over subordinates. The United States Court of
Id. at 506. The panel somewhat blithely insisted that the en banc decision of Lanier was "not to
the contrary," insofar as it stated that the Supreme Court had never "explicitly held that the
'right to be free from rape and sexual assault and harassment' was 'a component of an enforcea-
ble general constitutional right to bodily integrity':
This is no doubt a true statement. The Supreme Court has never so held; and until
today, this court has not had the opportunity to consider the question. In any case,
Lanier's reasoning on this issue is of limited applicability in the civil context, where the
constitutional concerns underlying the Lanier decision are simply nonexistent.
Id. at 507; see also Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438, 439 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of
judicial immunity in companion § 1983 case against Judge Lanier on the grounds that his nonju-
dicial acts were not entitled to the statute's qualified immunity, while remarking that the crimi-
nal conviction under § 242 was vacated "for reasons that are not important to this appeal").
135. Eleanor Linn, et al., Bitter Lessons for All: Sexual Harassment in Schools, in GENDER
AND SEXUALITY 106 (James Sears ed., 1992).
136. Karen Bogart & Nan Stein, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Education, 64
PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 146, 146 (1987). Nan Stein, currently affiliated with the Wellesley College
Center for Research on Women, previously was a civil rights equity specialist with the Massachu-
setts Department of Education. Karen Bogart is the president of the Anne Steinmann Institute
of Maferr Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit center for applied social research in Washington D.C.
My thanks to Nan Stein for sharing her insights with me.
137. Id. at 147.
138. Id.
139. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
140. Compare the employment cases supra note 116.
141. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in a Title IX case that the dis-
tinctions between the workplace and schools underscore the even
greater need to protect against such discrimination in education:
The ability to control and influence behavior exists to an even
greater extent in the classroom than in the workplace, as students
look to their teachers for guidance as well as for protection. The
damage caused by sexual harassment also is arguably greater in the
classroom than in the workplace, because the harassment has a
greater and longer lasting impact on its young victims, and institu-
tionalizes sexual harassment as accepted behavior. Moreover, as ec-
onomically difficult as it may be for adults to leave a hostile
workplace, it is virtually impossible for children to leave their as-
signed school. Finally, "a nondiscriminatory environment is essen-
tial to maximum intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part
of the educational benefits that a student receives. A sexually abu-
sive environment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from
developing her full intellectual potential and receiving the most
from the academic program."'1 42
In other words, children who are sexually harassed (or abused) in
school are denied the intended benefits of their education that other
students receive.
The injuries inflicted by sexual harassment in schools, moreover,
may extend beyond the immediate victims. Expert commentators re-
port that "[b]ystanders and witnesses to incidents of harassment ex-
press cynicism about education and a loss of confidence in the
effectiveness of school policies."'1 43 Finally, sexual harassment "is
maintained by silence"-the silence of victims, of observers who over-
look or do not report, and of the educational community. 144
These insights about sexual harassment (which includes noncon-
tact and contact conduct) are not meant to suggest that the liberty
interest invoked by Jane Doe derives from Title VII or Title IX, or to
gloss over the differences between milder forms of sexual harassment
and the rape committed by the school teacher in Taylor.145 Rather,
the sexual assault on a minor involved in Taylor implicates the bodily
142. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91 F.3d
1418 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp.
1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1993)) (talking about damages under Title IX for hostile environment
created by peers when supervising authorities know about it and do not stop it).
143. Bogart & Stein, supra note 136, at 147.
144. See id.
145. The Sixth Circuit has used "shock the conscience" as the dividing line between ordinary
sexual harassment in schools and that which goes so far as to infringe a liberty interest. See
Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1996) (teacher's conduct
which was held not to "shock the conscience" included rubbing the student's stomach in the
hallway and making suggestive remarks, which was part of a pattern and practice of similar
behavior with other students). But the conduct at issue in Taylor went far beyond, culminating
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integrity line of liberty interests. The analysis of sexual harassment,
however, highlights the context of power exploited by teachers who
sexually abuse school children in their charge. While law enforcement
authorities may have the power of arrest and a gun in their belt, teach-
ers also exercise significant power over children in school, albeit in a
more benign guise. 146 The two systems of power of the school and of
sexuality mutually reinforce each other, putting girls in their place and
poisoning their first experience with government in a democratic
society.
UNDER "COLOR OF STATE LAW" AND "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT":
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW DISTINGUISHED
Judge Garwood acknowledges in his dissent that Stroud "use[d]
and abuse[d] his position as a teacher" in "worming his way into [Jane
in intercourse and statutory rape. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.
1994).
The school sex abuse cases generally involve contact conduct which constitutes criminal as-
sault on a minor. See, e.g., Taylor, 15 F.3d at 449 (sex acts and statutory rape by teacher who
pled guilty to criminal charges); Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1995) (school custo-
dian pled guilty to forcible sexual penetration of a high school child); Larson v. Miller, 55 F.3d
1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1995) (nine-year-old handicapped student fondled and assaulted by bus
driver); Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1993) (teacher who
molested first grader convicted of indecency with a child); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985
F.2d 707, 709 (3d Cir. 1993) (bus driver's sexual assault on schoolchildren aged six, seven, and
eight); Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 1991) (teacher's fondling, as-
sault, and/or sodomy of six elementary school children); Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901
F.2d 642, 643 (8th Cir. 1990) (bus driver pled guilty to sexually molesting five handicapped chil-
dren in his charge); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 722 (3d Cir. 1989) (sex
acts by high school teacher with student which led to criminal prosecution).
Interestingly, given the right context, noncontact purely verbal conduct has been held to
violate the standards of the Eighth Amendment's proscription on "cruel and unusual punish-
ment," presumably a much tougher standard than the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
"liberty." In Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of
Columbia, the district court held (in a ruling that was not changed by the subsequent history of
the case) that under the objective standard of the Eighth Amendment, the women prisoners
established a "deprivation which amounts to a wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. The
evidence revealed a level of sexual harassment which is so malicious that it violates contempo-
rary standards of decency." 877 F. Supp. 634,664-65 (D.C. 1994), modified and vacated in part on
other grounds, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.C. 1995), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 93
F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The physical assaults including "rape, coerced sodomy, unsolicited
touching of women prisoners' vaginas, breasts and buttocks by prison employees are simply not
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Women Pris-
oners, 877 F. Supp. at 665 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994)). Furthermore,
taken in combination, the "vulgar sexual remarks of prison officers, the lack of privacy within
CTF cells and the refusal of some male guards to announce their presence in the living areas of
women prisoners constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment since they mutually height-
ened the psychological injury of women prisoners." Id.
146. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995) (upholding urinalysis
of student athletes on grounds that schools exercise power that is custodial and tutelary, permit-
ting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults).
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Doe's] affections."'1 47 But the intercourse, which was the culmination
of Stroud's campaign, he observed, "came later, albeit doubtless in
some sense as an ultimate result of the former conduct."'1 48 Judge
Garwood questioned, however, whether the "causal connection be-
tween the earlier 'under color of law' conduct and the later otherwise
purely personal and consensual relationship between this fifteen-year-
old girl and Stroud caused the latter conduct to also be 'under color of
law.' "149 If she was old enough, (capable of bearing children), then
the sex (abuse) became consensual and private, and was not inflicted
"under color of state law."'150
This extraordinary argument privatizes both the teacher's con-
duct and Jane Doe's injuries. According to this view, a state actor
who used and abused his position as a teacher would be immunized in
large part because of the dissent's view of sex and young women.
Girls who are in their first year of high school will be held to a high
standard of responsibility for their sexual behavior. It is up to them to
control their teacher by saying "no" that one last time. Teachers, on
the other hand, have little responsibility to act like teachers. They can
misuse the trust and authority granted to them as guardians of their
charges, and so long as they succeed without overt violence, they have
committed only private wrongs.
Caught in the Ingraham dilemma, the dissenters thus produced a
novel, and very dangerous, solution. Injury to a school child's per-
sonal security in the form of corporal punishment is clearly state ac-
tion taken under color of state law, even when it is excessive,
egregious, and motivated by personal malice.' 5' School officials in the
Fifth Circuit are proof against any kind of substantive due process
claim only because of the underlying disciplinary objective and privi-
lege to punish schoolchildren in this way.' 52 But make the assault on
the child's personal security totally unjustified and the dissent sud-
denly finds another fault: this arbitrary injury is somehow not perpe-
trated "under color of state law" (as required by the civil rights
statute), or perhaps is not even "state action" at all. 153




151. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677 (1977).
152. See Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1988); Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F.2d 909, 916-17 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
153. See Taylor, 15 F.3d at 476 (Jones, J., dissenting) (contending that the coach's conduct
"by no stretch of the imagination was ever undertaken in the scope of a teacher's pedagogical
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The dissenting opinions arrive at this conclusion by a sub silentio
importation of the common law doctrine of "scope of employment"
into § 1983 jurisprudence, effectively undermining the unique mean-
ing of "under color of state law" in the Reconstruction-era civil rights
statute.154 In the 1961 case, Monroe v. Pape,l5 5 the Court's interpreta-
tion of the "under color of state law" language in § 1983 "resusci-
tated" a statute which had been virtually moribund since its
enactment in 1871.156 The Court had already interpreted the congres-
sional intent behind that phrase when considering a related criminal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242.157 In United States v. Classic,58 the Court
first defined "under color of state law" to include "[m]isuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."'1 59 In criminal
prosecutions under this statute, courts have treated extraction of sex-
ual favors by law enforcement authorities as conduct "under color of
state law."'16
The majority and concurring opinions in Monroe adopted the
criminal statute's misuse of state power construction. 161 Frankly, I
have always found Justice Douglas' explanation of the legislative his-
tory of the "under color of state law" provision less than persuasive. 162
authority" and is therefore not covered by § 1983); id. at 487-88 (Garza, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing that the coach did not act under color of state law).
154. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
155. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. 2136 U.S.
658 (1978).
156. See Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133, 1169 (1977).
157. Section 242 derives from § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was reenacted after
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the 1870 Force Act. See Monroe, 365 U.S.
at 183.
158. 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 242 which provides criminal punish-
ment for anyone who "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom" subjects
any inhabitant of a State to the deprivation of any federally secured rights).
159. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). The
Monroe Court also observed that the Court adhered to this definition of "under color of state
law" subsequently. See id. at 184-85 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-13 (1945);
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70, 99 (1951)). Justice Douglas remarked that despite ample
opportunity to repudiate this interpretation, Congress made no effort to do so. See Monroe, 365
U.S. at 186-87.
160. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
161. See 365 U.S. at 183-87; id. at 192-94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
162. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-83.
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At the same time, I am very fond of Justice Harlan's concurring expla-
nation. Although he agreed with Justice Frankfurter's dissent that
Congress "had no intention of taking over the whole field of ordinary
state torts and crimes," he ended up siding with the majority.163 Jus-
tice Harlan wrote that Congress might well have "regarded actions by
an official, made possible by his position, as far more serious than an
ordinary state tort, and therefore as a matter of federal concem."'1
Monroe established that individual lawlessness of those clothed
with state authority creates a federal case. But the dissenters in Taylor
either cannot see the distinction between harm at the hands of ordi-
nary thugs and injury inflicted by representatives of the state, or they
do not care for its implications. As a result, in one way or another, all
the dissenting opinions obscured that important difference. Judge
Garwood improperly conflated "scope of employment" doctrine,
which in the common law serves to place limits on the vicarious liabil-
ity of employers for the torts of their agents, with § 1983's "under
color of state law" concept. 65 In derogation of the teachings of
Monroe, Judge Jones found that a sexual assault by a school teacher
on a student is no more serious than an "ordinary crime," which it was
"just as surely as if he had stolen Doe's watch."' 66 Judge Garza's
opinion went even further: he reinvented a discredited distinction be-
tween state officials who merely "exceed the limits of authority, as in
Monroe" and those who "[act] in the complete absence of author-
ity.' 67 He even questioned whether the coach's conduct amounted to
state action. 168
Judge Garwood's dissent cited City of Green Cove Springs v.
Donaldson for the proposition that Stroud's "fondling and statutory
rape" could not be said to be in the "course and scope of his employ-
ment."'1 69 In Green Cove Springs, a police officer raped a woman
whom he had arrested.170 The case, however, had nothing to do with
"color of state law.' 71 It was not even brought under § 1983. In-
163. Id. at 193 (Harlan, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 468 (5th Cir. 1994) (Garwood, J., dis-
senting); see also id. at 488 (Garza, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 477 (Jones, J., dissenting).
167. ld. at 486 (Garza, J., dissenting).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 468 n.7 (Garwood, J., dissenting) (citing City of Green Cove Springs v. Donald-
son, 348 F.2d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that a police officer's rape of an arrestee is not
within the scope of his employment)); see also id. at 488 (Garza, J., dissenting).
170. 348 F.2d at 199.
171. Compare Jones v. Welham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (section 1983 claim against
police officer who detained woman for alleged traffic violation and then raped her is in the
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stead, the issue was whether plaintiffs could recover under state law
from the city for its own negligence in not posting a matron, or on a
respondeat superior basis, for the intentional tort of its employee. 172
Plaintiffs lost their ordinary tort claim in Green Cove Springs be-
cause, although generally available, vicarious liability does not apply
where the employee is not acting within the course and scope of his
employment. 173 The traditional (and narrowest) common-law inter-
pretation holds that conduct is "not within the scope of employment if
it is different in kind from that authorized [by the employer], far be-
yond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a
purpose to serve the master."'1 74 As a result, many state courts have
held that sexual assaults committed by employees are not in the scope
of employment. 175 Scope of employment doctrine limits the strict lia-
nature of a violation of the substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment not
to be subjected to the wanton infliction of physical harm by anyone acting under color of state
law), with Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1072-74, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 1996) (remanding trial for
§ 1983 claims against a police officer alleged to have raped a minor he drove home from the
scene of a complaint about a party, while affirming summary judgment for the city defendant
because there was insufficient evidence that the officer's sexual misconduct was caused by a
custom or policy of the municipality), and Almand v. DeKalb County, 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("We accept that, under certain circumstances, a rape of a person by a police officer or
other state actor could violate the Constitution."). The majority in Almand denied the plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim because the officer forcibly broke into the victim's house. See id. at 1514-15.
Although the off-duty and ununiformed officer initially gained access to the plaintiff under pre-
tense of police business, the plaintiff was able to persuade him to leave at first. See id. at 1514.
He immediately turned around, however, and broke down her door, committing the rape inside.
See id. Although the majority of the court considered that the original entry into the home was
"probably ... under color of state law," it distinguished the forcible break-in as similar to the
private act of any other "ruffian." Id. at 1515. A dissent, on the other hand, found sufficient
facts to suggest that the break-in also was facilitated by the officer's abuse of his position. See id.
at 1516-17 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
Compare also, supra note 117, for the numerous sexual assaults by law enforcement officers
found to be "under color of state law" for purposes of a criminal indictment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1994).
172. See Green Cove Springs, 348 F.2d at 200, 202; see also Taylor, 15 F.3d at 488 n.24 (Garza,
J., dissenting) (citing McLaren v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1364, 1370-71 (N.D.
Tex. 1991) (finding that for purposes of construing scope of insurance policy for law enforcement
professional liability, sexual assault by police officer was outside the scope of his employment
under Texas law).
173. See Green Cove Springs, 348 F.2d at 202-03.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). This Restatement formulation de-
fines "scope of employment" more narrowly than the law of many states. See Rochelle Rubin
Weber, Note, "Scope of Employment" Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sex-
ual Assaults Committed by Their Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1541 (1992).
175. See Green Cove Springs, 348 F.2d at 203 (applying Florida law to a sexual assault com-
mitted by a police officer); Gutierrez v. Thorne, 537 A.2d 527, 530-31 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988)
(applying Connecticut law to a sexual assault committed by a Department of Mental Retarda-
tion employee); Webb v. Jewel Cos., 485 N.E.2d 409,412-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (applying Illinois
law to a sexual assault committed by a grocery store security guard)); Weber, supra note 174, at
1513 n.2 (citing and quoting parentheticals of Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277, 1279
(4th Cir. 1978) (applying South Carolina law to a rape committed by a private security officer).
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bility of respondeat superior to circumstances arguably more in line
with its purpose: allocating risks to the enterprise that gives rise to
them.176 However, the Supreme Court has ruled that there is no vica-
rious liability or respondeat superior in § 1983.177 Thus, there is no
need to borrow the scope of employment limitation from the common
law because there is no strict liability to limit.
Ironically, even the common law sometimes recognizes that an
abuse of power can be within the scope of employment. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court recently ruled in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles
that a jury could decide that a police officer's rape of a woman he
detained was in the scope of his employment for purposes of holding
the city vicariously liable. 178 The court emphasized the great power
and control granted to police officers and found it foreseeable that on
occasion some of them would "misuse that authority by engaging in
assaultive conduct."'1 79 The potential for abuse was "[i]nherent in this
formidable power.' 80 In a strange quirk, the California Supreme
Court had to distinguish Mary M. from John R., an earlier case involv-
ing sexual assault by a school teacher.' 81 I find the distinctions made
Other courts, however, have found employer liability for sexual assaults committed by em-
ployees. See Weber, supra note 174, at 1513 n.2 (citing and quoting parentheticals of Simmons v.
United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Washington law to a sexual en-
counter between a counselor and a patient); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341,
1349-52 (Cal. 1991) (applying California law to a rape by a police officer); Applewhite v. City of
Baton Rouge, 380 So.2d 119, 121-22 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (applying Louisiana law to a rape com-
mitted by a police officer)).
176. See Weber, supra note 174. at 1518-19; see, e.g., Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa
Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 448 (Cal. 1995) (distinguishing forseeability for respondeat superior in light
of doctrine's purposes of allocating costs to the enterprise); id. at 463 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(citing Justice Traynor on the purposes of scope of employment doctrine).
177. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-93 (1978).
178. 814 P.2d 1341, 1352 (Cal. 1991). It may be no accident that rape is being reconstructed
as an abuse of power in the 1990s. See Justice Arabian's concurring opinion on the changing
attitudes toward rape. See id at 1353-54 (Arabian, J., concurring) ("When the police officer's
special edge-the shield, gun and baton, the aura of command and the irresistible power of
arrest-is employed to further a rape, the betrayal suffered by the victim is an especially bitter
one."). Justice Arabian has been an activist involved with rape crisis groups. See Justice Ara-
bian's biography, available in WestLaw, WLD-Judge Library.
For the change from a narrower "business purpose" test for scope of employment to one
emphasizing foreseeability and causation, see J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REv. 273, 291-92, 291 n.52 (1995).
179. Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1350.
180. Id. at 1349.
181. See John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956-57 (Cal. 1989) (holding that
sexual assault at teacher's apartment as part of sanctioned extracurricular activity is not within
the scope of employment). According to the Mary M. court, John R. emphasized that to impose
vicarious liability in that particular circumstance would be a case of the prevention being worse
than the harm. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1347. It would effectively halt all extracurricular and
one-on-one activities in the school. See id. The court further distinguished John R. because the
nexus between the authority given to teachers and sexual abuse was too attenuated to fall within
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in Mary M. somewhat questionable and think that the John R. teacher
decision could have benefitted from some of the insights about rape
and power reflected in Justice Arabian's concurring opinion in Mary
M.182 Be that as it may, honest dialogue with the common law would
be superior to disingenuous conflation. The "color of state law" doc-
trine serves different purposes than the varying degrees of limitation
placed on vicarious liability in the common law.
Judge Jones' dissent added another justification for characterizing
the teacher's assault as a private act, not inflicted under color of state
law. She argued that without some state policy behind the state actor,
the range of risks allocable to a teacher's employer. See id. at 1349. Police officers, on the other
hand, enjoyed much more authority with potential for abuse. See id.
For a different view of sexual abuse by teachers and the "scope of employment," see P. L. v.
Aubert, 527 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (whether the district will be vicariously liable
for teacher's sexual abuse of 11th grader depends on the fact questions of whether the abuse was
related to the teacher's duties and whether it occurred within the work-related limits of time and
place). The Aubert court recognized that as a result of her position the teacher "was able to
exert influence and control over P.L. who was particularly susceptible to being manipulated."
Id. at 147. The school district was aware of other sexual contact between teachers and students
and "[i]n any event, the unfortunate reality is that sexual abuse of students by teachers has
become a well-known hazard. Aubert's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem
unfair to include the resulting loss from among other costs associated with operating the school
district." Id. The court of appeals' decision was reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
P.L. v. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 1996). The court held that although the acts occurred
within work-related limits of time and place, the employer was not liable because the misconduct
was unforeseeable and unrelated to the duties of the employee. See id. at 668. The student and
teacher both did their best to conceal the relationship, which was even carried on in the class-
room with other students present. See id. at 667. The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished
this case from an earlier case finding that a psychologist's sexual relationship with his patient
occurred in the course and scope of his employment because there was evidence that such rela-
tionships were a "well-known hazard" in that situation. See id. at 667-68. Here, however, there
was no evidence of the hazard and thus no foreseeability. "While it is true that teachers have
power and authority over students, no expert testimony or affidavits were presented regarding
the potential for abuse of such power in these situations; thus there can be no implied foresee-
ability." Id. at 668. This statement implies that the result might have been different if the plain-
tiff had done a better job with the evidence.
182. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1353-54 (Arabian, J., concurring). But see Lisa M. v. Henry
Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995) (holding hospital technician's sexual mo-
lestation of patient not within scope of employment). Justice Arabian concurred in the Lisa M.
decision. See id. at 367.
Compare Doe v. Estes, 926 F. Supp. 979, 989 (D. Nev. 1996), which ruled that respondeat
superior was available against a school district on the common law claim arising out of a school
teacher's sexual assault on a six-year-old child. The court held that this result was dictated by
Prell Hotel Corp. v. Antonacci, 469 P.2d 399 (Nev. 1970), in which vicarious liability was imposed
on a casino for the assault on a patron by a blackjack operator. The court stated:
This court fails to discern any principled legal distinction between a battery claim
against a casino whose blackjack dealer slugs a patron and the same claim against a
school district whose teacher fondles a student. In both cases the plaintiff was on the
defendant's premises for the purpose of enjoying the defendant's services. In neither
case can it reasonably be argued that the employee's duties included acts of common
law battery.
Estes, 926 F. Supp. at 989.
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the coach's motive was only "crass self-gratification. ' 183 But, Judge
Jones continued,
The Constitution has little to say about state actors who commit
ordinary crimes for their own benefit. Compare Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984). That task is better left to statutory and com-
mon law. "It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United
States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say
that they do not address the same concerns." Daniels, 474 U.S. at
333.184
Although I agree that traditional tort law and the United States
Constitution address different concerns, I do not see how that trans-
forms the depredations of a state official into private conduct. As has
already been discussed, even if it does not rank as a fundamental
right, the liberty interest in bodily integrity nonetheless is substan-
tively protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from totally arbitrary state deprivations. 8 5 Thus, there is
a federally guaranteed right at stake, not simply a traditional tort law
concern. Moreover, the loss was at the hands of a state employee who
"use[d] and abuse[d] his position as a teacher" to gain access to and
power over the student he targeted for his sexual imposition.186 That
is abuse of power and therefore is precisely the kind of situation
§ 1983 is designed to address. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
many times that school teachers exercise state power over the children
consigned to their care by compulsory education laws. 187 When they
183. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J., dissenting).
184. Id. In Hudson, the Court ruled that even an intentional deprivation of an inmate's
property did not violate procedural due process so long as it was "random and unauthorized."
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 553 (1984). Since the state could not anticipate such depri-
vations in advance, no predeprivation hearing could be held and "due process of law" would be
satisfied by adequate postdeprivation state tort remedies. See id. The Hudson ruling extended
the Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), "adequate state remedy" line of cases to intentional
deprivations. See id. Subsequently, the Court clearly ruled that the "random and unauthorized"
limitation applied to procedural due process only, and not to substantive claims. See Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). For a discussion of Zinermon, see Oren, supra note 93.
185. See supra notes 57-100 and accompanying text.
186. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 468 (Garwood, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391-93 (1995). The Court
acknowledged that an earlier case rejected the notion that public schools merely exercise paren-
tal-type power over the children within their walls. The Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 336 (1985), found such a notion inconsistent with compulsory education laws. The Court's
decisions on due process and free speech in schools also reflect a belief that the state's power
over school children is more than just the delegated power of their parents. Rather, it is "custo-
dial" and "tutelary," thereby permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be
exercised over free adults. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. The Acton Court was careful, however,
to disavow any DeShaney-type consequences of this reality. Justice Scalia wrote that they were
not suggesting that the degree of control exercised over school children was sufficient to give rise
to a DeShaney constitutional duty to protect. See id. at 2391-92. Taylor, however, does not
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abuse that authority by violating constitutional rights, they must an-
swer in § 1983.
Judge Garza's opinion also minimized the fact that the perpetra-
tor in Taylor was a teacher who sexually assaulted his student and not
just any passing private party. He did so by reinventing a distinction
between state officials who merely "exceed the limits of authority, as
in Monroe" and those who "[act] in the complete absence of author-
ity," a distinction based on a lapsed and discredited state action doc-
trine.188 Judge Garza resurrected an old state action case, Barney v.
City of New York, 189 for the proposition that "state action does not
exist when the act complained of 'was not only not authorized, but
was forbidden by [state] legislation.' "' 190 But Judge Garza quite
rightly recognized that subsequent Supreme Court decisions ques-
tioned the continuing validity of Barney.191 Moreover, the basic posi-
tion taken in Barney, i.e., that "it is for the state courts to remedy acts
of state officers done without the authority of, or contrary to, state
law,"' 92 was essentially repudiated in the § 1983 context by Monroe v.
Pape.193
Section 1983 cases addressing the circumstances under which
judges forfeit their absolute immunity merely underline the meaning-
lessness for "under color of state law" of any distinction between acts
done in the excess of jurisdiction and conduct in the absence of juris-
diction. Under the statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
judges enjoy a defense of absolute immunity from individual liability
involve a DeShaney duty to protect against harm inflicted by private actors. Rather, it concerns
a supervisor's responsibility for the misconduct of a subordinate who is a state actor himself.
188. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 486, (Garza, J., dissenting).
189. 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
190. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 481 (quoting Barney, 193 U.S. at 437).
191. See id. at 484-85 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960)) ("Barney...
must be regarded as having been worn away by the erosion of time. .. and of contrary author-
ity.") (internal quotations omitted).
192. Id. at 481 (quoting Barney, 193 U.S. at 438).
193. 365 U.S. 167 (1960), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S.
658 (1978). In fact, Justice Frankfurter's dissent unsuccessfully argued that very point. In the
name of "our federalism," Justice Frankfurter wanted to define conduct "under color of state
law" as action which was officially authorized in some sense, either because the state approved
of it or refused redress to the victims in state court. See id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
But the Court rejected this interpretation of the statute. Instead, it opted for the broader misuse
of state power construction already established in § 242 criminal jurisprudence and in state ac-
tion doctrine since Home Telephone and Telegraph v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172, 183-87; see id. at 194-202 (Harlan, J., concurring). Home Telephone and
Telegraph held that "where an officer or other representative of a State, in the exercise of the
authority with which he is clothed misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the




for their judicial acts, "even when such acts are in excess of their juris-
diction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or cor-
ruptly."' 94 As a consequence, the Court ruled that a judge who signed
an order for sterilization of a young woman on her mother's bare re-
quest and without any pretense of engaging in a judicial-type proceed-
ing was absolutely immune from a suit for damages. 195 On the other
hand, judges who act in the complete absence of jurisdiction, such as
the traffic judge who had a vendor brought before him in handcuffs
because the coffee that he sold was "putrid," are still state actors, but
they lose the defense of absolute immunity.196
This is not to say that there may not be a rare instance in which a
state official acts in a purely private capacity and thus may not be held
to be a state actor or, since the two concepts largely coincide, some-
one acting "under color of state law.' 97 For example, some § 1983
cases cited by the dissent involved altercations with friends or rela-
tives of the state official, a continuation of private disputes arising
outside of their use of state authority. 198 Sometimes the actions were
not "under color of state law" because they arose out of facts that
were too unrelated (in time, place, or kind) to the exercise of that
official's authority.199
194. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978).
195. See id. at 351-55. For trenchant criticism of this decision, see Irene Merker Rosenberg,
Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833 (1978).
196. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding award of punitive dam-
ages against the judge), cited with approval in Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 858 n.17 (5th Cir.
1981). Harper involved a judge who unilaterally decided to detain a man who happened to enter
his office in order to leave a child support payment for his ex-wife who was employed there as a
secretary to another judge. See id at 850-51. When the ex-husband walked out on the judge,
bailiffs chased and captured him, bringing him before the judge who then held an ersatz "hear-
ing" based on the judge's own "complaint" and sent him off to jail. See id. at 851-54; see also,
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (judge not immune from liability for nonjudicial ac-
tions or for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction).
197. In virtually all situations where the defendant being sued is a state employee, the consti-
tutional concept of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment and the statutory concept
of "under color of state law" under § 1983 coincide. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 929 (1982). But see Polk v. Dodson County, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981) (holding that a public
defender who was a state actor nonetheless was not acting "under color of state law" because in
representing his client he was ethically bound to act independently, even adversely to the inter-
ests of his state employer).
198. See, e.g., Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1982) (off-duty
police officer shot his wife with his service revolver); Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408
(5th Cir. 1981) (police officer's altercation with his sister-in-law while he was on duty). But see
United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1991) (sheriff acted under color of state law
during assault on wife's former lover which occurred in the sheriff's home but where the "pres-
ence of police and air of official authority pervaded the entire incident").
199. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cannon, 751 F. Supp. 765, 767 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (worker offered two
girls waiting at a bus stop a lift in his county-provided car and then he raped them); Morgan v.
Tice, 862 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1989) (a town manager did not act under color of state law
when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff who was running for mayor;
[Vol. 72:747
SECTION 1983 AND SEX ABUSE IN SCHOOLS
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently stretched this
concern with remoteness to include an eleven-year-old boy who was
molested "more than five months after [the child] withdrew from the
school where [the teacher] taught. ' 200 Although the music teacher
(who had previously been acquitted of a prior indecency-with-a-child
charge and had subsequently been transferred to a new school after
new allegations surfaced) initially gained access to the child in the
classroom, the parents permitted the relationship to continue after the
child left the school.201 The court concluded that the sexual assaults
were not under color of state law because of the lack of a nexus be-
tween the "activity out of which the violation arises" and the teacher's
duties and obligations as a teacher. 202 The assaults first occurred at
the child's home, more than five months after the child left the
teacher's classroom.203 The court emphasized that "Asher's contacts
with Juan thereafter were in no way part of his duties as a state em-
ployee, were not school-sponsored, and were not reported to any
school official. ' '2°4 Conceding that there was evidence that the teacher
"befriended" and showed "a special interest" in the child at school,
the Fifth Circuit noted that there was no evidence of physical sexual
abuse at the school: "Unlike in Doe [v. Taylor], Asher was not Juan's
teacher 'before, during and after' the sexual abuse, nor was this
wrongful conduct 'on and off school grounds.' "205 In spirit, this ruling
owes something to the proximate cause reasoning of Martinez v. Cali-
fornia, which held that a parole board was not constitutionally respon-
sible for the murder of a fifteen-year-old girl some five months after
the parolee's release.206
By contrast to the cases where the state actor's conduct is too
remote from the exercise of his state authority, sexual assaults by
school teachers who locate and pursue their prey on school grounds
and use their position to win compliance are easy cases. It is perhaps
no coincidence that coaches and band directors figure prominently in
the statement was made during a stopover on his own time in another town). Judge Garwood
cited a case in which a teacher assaulted boys staying at his home with the permission of their
parents during the summer when the teacher had no teaching or coaching duties for the school.
See D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1192 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding no state
action and no action under color of state law); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 466-
67 (5th Cir. 1994) (Garwood, J., dissenting).
200. Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1997).
201. See id. at 1044.




206. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
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these cases. Teachers who can grant passes and special favors and
meet their students outside of the regular classroom are in the best
position to exploit their power.20 7 In light of the incidence of school
bus drivers who target young or handicapped children in their charge
by virtue of their state position, those also are easy cases.
208
The custodian cases admittedly require more analysis to deter-
mine whether they implicate action under color of state law or may
fairly be characterized as private conduct instead. In Doe v. Hillsboro
Independent School District, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered the liability of a school district and its supervisory person-
nel who "hired convicted criminals and then failed to supervise them
adequately. '209 The case involved wholesale defaults by the school
district in hiring and in investigating reports of sexual abuse which the
court found amounted to "deliberate indifference" to the girl's right to
bodily integrity. 210 Although the custodian who perpetrated the as-
sault was not a defendant in the lawsuit, the Fifth Circuit held that he
was a state actor and not a third party:211 "[W]hen a school employee
is rightfully on the premises, during school hours, ostensibly perform-
ing his assigned duties, and-predictably-finds himself alone with a
student, constitutional deprivations perpetrated by that school em-
ployee on the person of that student might be found to have occurred
in the course of employment. ' 212 The majority, however, apparently
was not comfortable relying on this holding alone. It repeatedly em-
phasized that the status of the custodian was not the relevant ques-
tion.213 Rather, they focused on the school officials who "creat[ed]
the circumstances that brought him in contact with Doe" and who
"did so under color of state law."'214
207. See Nan D. Stein, It Happens Here, Too: Sexual Harassment and Child Sexual Abuse in
Elementary and Secondary Schools, in GENDER AND EDUCATION 191, 196-97 (S.K. Bilken & D.
Pollard eds., 1993) ("prototypical" role that band director harasser had in school).
208. See, e.g., Larson v. Miller, 55 F.3d 1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1995) (bus driver assaulted nine-
year-old handicapped student with minimal communicative abilities); Black v. Indiana Area Sch.
Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 708 (3d Cir. 1993) (bus driver molested several six- to eight-year-old girls);
Doe A. v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 643 (8th Cir. 1990) (school bus driver molested 11
handicapped children).
209. 81 F.3d 1395, 1398 (5th Cir. 1996) (custodian raped school child).
210. See id. at 1403.
211. See id. at 1402.
212. Id. at 1407.
213. See id. at 1406.
214. Id. at 1407. Compare the facts in Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 1995). In
Jojola, the complaint alleged that a parent told the principal that the custodian drilled a hole in
the wall of the girls' locker room so that he could observe them. See id. at 491. Rumors circu-
lated in school which the plaintiffs alleged the supervisors should have investigated. See id. An-
other parent supposedly complained to a principal of a high school where the custodian
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Judge Garza's dissent in Hillsborough is right, in part, to take the
panel to task for evading the question of the custodian's status.215 To
do so is to move away from the straightforward issue of supervisory
liability for the conduct of someone else who is clearly a state actor.216
If custodians are not state actors or acting under color of state law,
then a DeShaney problem may arise. In DeShaney, the Supreme
Court strictly limited the circumstances under which state child wel-
fare officials could be held liable for failing to protect a child from
assault by his father, a private party in the "free" world. 217 Since it is
not clear that schools would satisfy the exceptions to the no-duty-to-
protect rule of DeShaney,21 8 if custodians were found to be private
parties in the free world just like the father in DeShaney, there would
be no underlying constitutional violation. Having stated the difficulty
that way, however, the distinction from DeShaney seems clear. Custo-
dians are not private parties in the "free world." Rather, they are
state employees who gained access to their victims through their state
positions.
Judge Jones' dissenting opinion also observed that Jane Doe had
other remedies available instead of § 1983: The coach went to jail for
the statutory rape; Doe could bring state-law tort claims for assault
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and "most
significant," Doe could bring a Title IX claim against the school dis-
trict and had done so.219 So, asked Judge Jones, why invoke a new
previously worked about his making sexual comments to girls. See id The petition stated that
he was "removed from his job as bus driver because of inappropriate behavior with a preteen
female student" and was "transferred to the high school after he unhooked brassieres of junior
high school girls." It But the court of appeals found that four incidents and other rumors over
19 years of employment were insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate "the requisite pat-
tern of behavior" to satisfy the notice requirement and to impose liability. Id.
215. See Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d at 1407 (Garza, J., dissenting).
216. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994). In Taylor, the
plaintiff disavowed any effort to establish an affirmative duty of school officials to protect stu-
dents from constitutional violations. See id.
217. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989). For criti-
cism of DeShaney, see Oren, DeShaney in Context, supra note 12, and Oren, Unfinished Busi-
ness, supra note 12.
218. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391-92 (1995) (dictum disavowing
suggestion that the degree of control exercised over school children was sufficient to give rise to
a DeShaney constitutional duty to protect).
219. See Taylor, 15 F.3d at 477.
In a recent holding, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also read Title IX
narrowly. The Fifth Circuit rejected the "pure agency" and "constructive notice" theories of
school district liability, along with the use of Title VII as a model, and the application of the new
OCR guidance on sexual harassment in schools, in favor of a standard requiring "actual notice"
of the harassment to the school district. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d
648, 656-57 (5th Cir. 1997). The court thought that the reasoning of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825 (1994), which defined deliberate indifference in the Eighth Amendment context, was persua-
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constitutional theory?220 Unless Congress makes a federal statutory
remedy exclusive, however, there is no bar to pleading a related con-
stitutional claim.221 Further, unlike § 1983, Title IX probably does not
permit suits against individual defendants.222 Finally, and most impor-
tant, Judge Jones misunderstands the relationship between state and
federal law. It is immaterial to constitutional tort remedies that the
proscribed conduct also violates state law. As the Court held in
Monroe: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked. ' 223 Section 1983 protects citizens from rogue
cops and rogue teachers alike. The Ingraham dilemma is not so easily
escaped.
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY: SECrION 1983 PERSONAL FAULT
DOCrRINE AND THE DIALOGUE WrH THE BACKGROUND
OF TORT LIABILITY
Having explored the limits of liberty interests under the Constitu-
tion, and exposed the Doe v. Taylor dissents' sub silentio attack on the
special meaning of "under color of state law" in the statute, the re-
sive. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 659. A prisoner can prevail on a prison-conditions claim only if
the inmate can show prison officials were subjectively reckless, that is, they were actually aware
of facts from which they could infer the risk of substantial harm, and they did in fact draw that
inference, but ignored it. See id. at 658. Likewise, the Rosa H. court would authorize a Title IX
calim only on the basis that the school district acted intentionally: it knew of the danger of
harassment and chose not to stop it. See id at 659.
220. See Taylor, 15 F.3d at 477 (Jones, J., dissenting).
221. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Lillard v. Shelby
County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 722-24 (6th Cir. 1996)). In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,
1012-13 (1984), the Court held that § 504 of the Education for Handicapped Act was the exclu-
sive means to secure a "free appropriate education" for handicapped children, precluding use of
§ 1983 to enforce overlapping claims based on the Equal Protection Clause. Smith was one of
the rare instances where such preclusion has been found and was soon overruled legislatively.
Congress amended the statute to make it clear that it meant to preserve the § 1983 remedy. See
W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995).
222. See, e.g., Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D. Tex. 1995),
rev'd on other grounds, Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). The
damages actions brought since Franklin typically seek recovery against the school district. But
see Oona R.-S v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (N. Cal. 1995) (Title IX may be
enforced against indivual defendants through § 1983); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 56
(D. Conn. 1995) (Title IX is applicable to individual defendants who exercise "some level of
control over the program or activity that the discrimination occurs under.").
223. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). Compare id. at 172 (misuse of state power violates the
statute regardless of whether the misconduct illegal under written and unwritten state law), with
id at 246-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Section 1983 remedy should only be available if the
misconduct was pursuant to written or unwritten state law or a remedy was denied through state
tort law immunities).
[Vol. 72:747
SECTION 1983 AND SEX ABUSE IN SCHOOLS
maining issue is supervisory liability: What is the appropriate standard
under § 1983 for holding supervisory officials individually liable for
constitutional violations committed by subordinates? The answer re-
quires interpretation of language in the statute which affixes liability
on any person who "subjects, or causes to be subjected" any citizen to
deprivations of federally-guaranteed rights.224 The Supreme Court
also has interpreted the "causes to be subjected" clause of the statute
with a unique § 1983 twist by departing from the ordinary rule of vica-
rious liability or respondeat superior that is found in the common
law.225 Yet, of all the issues discussed in this Article, this is the one
which nonetheless provides the greatest opportunity for dialogue with
the "background of tort liability" which "informs" interpretation of
the statutory elements of § 1983.226 The relationship is not a simple
one, but that is nothing new in § 1983 jurisprudence.
227
The Court has held that the "subjects, or causes to be subjected"
element of § 1983 requires proof of some kind of personal fault or
direct responsibility by each individual or governmental defendant.
Vicarious liability is not permitted under § 1983 and it is also very
difficult to find the government employer otherwise responsible for
constitutional wrongs committed by state officials. Establishing per-
sonal fault on the part of individual supervisors is a distinct issue and
should not require the same level of proof necessary to reach the gov-
ernmental entity itself. But in the sex abuse in schools cases, federal
courts have held officials liable only if their defaults in supervision
met the heightened standard of causation and culpability developed
for municipal liability. The lower federal courts generally have bor-
rowed "deliberate indifference," the test the Court adopted in City of
Canton v. Harris for municipal liability for the failure to train its of-
ficers. 22 However, this is an inappropriate transposition of standards.
Even if "deliberate indifference" is the correct formula, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's three-part test is superior to the four-
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
225. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (although recognizing
municipal liability, ruling that there is no vicarious liability under § 1983).
226. For the background of tort liability and statutory interpretation in § 1983, see Nahmod,
supra note 15, at 956.
227. For example, the Court read immunity defenses into § 1983 on the basis that the 1871
Congress could not have intended to abolish well-recognized common law defenses sub silentio.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). But in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982),
the Court significantly departed from the common law framework. See Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (admitting that Harlow was a departure from the common law). Fur-
thermore, the Court failed to read the common law accurately in the first place. See Oren, supra
note 17, at 944-45.
228. 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).
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step approach of other circuits. In any case, the courts also have been
requiring too much from the facts of teacher sexual abuse cases.
The unsatisfactory treatment of supervisory liability in the school
sex abuse cases is further illuminated when viewed against the rele-
vant background of tort liability. It is true that contemporary com-
mon law incorporates vicarious liability, a theory of recovery which
imputes the employee's wrong to the employer, but which is forbidden
under § 1983 jurisprudence. To a degree that is still disputed, modern
civil rights statutes such as Title VII and Title IX also may require the
employer or institution to answer for violations perpetrated by its
agents. On the other hand, the common law is not about vicarious
liability alone. Instead, it also includes theories of direct liability.
Thus, it is possible to reconcile a part of the background of tort liabil-
ity with the § 1983 mandate that each individual defendant must be
personally responsible for the actionable deprivation. Dialogue be-
tween federal and state law, therefore, can help point the way toward
a new standard of liability for supervisory school officials who are re-
sponsible for constitutional violations inflicted by their subordinates.
A. Monell, Rizzo, and City of Canton: Personal Responsibility,
Municipal Liability, and Heightened Causation in
Section 1983
The Court's interpretation of § 1983 has made it very difficult to
reach the governmental employer. It is easier to enforce the statute
against individual defendants who are alleged to have misused or
abused their state-granted authority. This displacement of § 1983 lia-
bility onto individual officials, whom Peter Schuck calls "street-level"
bureaucrats, 229 originated in Monroe v. Pape.230 In addition to defin-
ing "under color of state law" so that individual defendants were lia-
ble even if their misconduct was unauthorized by official policy,
Monroe also ruled that governments could not be sued under the stat-
ute at all.231 Some fifteen years later, however, Monell v. Department
of Social Services232 reversed the second ruling of Monroe, thereby
opening a window to claims against municipalities. 233
229. See Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Pub-
lic Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Cr. REv. 281, 324.
230. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 663 (1978).
231. See id. at 187.
232. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
233. See id. at 663.
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In the meantime, however, Rizzo v. Goode234 was decided, the
only "supervisory liability" case to reach the Supreme Court.
Although Rizzo introduced a causation problem into § 1983 jurispru-
dence, it is best understood as a pre-Monell, Monell case. Like Ex
Parte Young,235 the suit was a legal fiction. In 1975, Monroe still pre-
vented the plaintiffs from reaching the city itself in order to obtain
broad systemic injunctive relief; the lawsuit consequently named a
number of high-level officials as individual defendants.236 Citizens'
groups sued the mayor, city manager, and police commissioner, seek-
ing to improve police procedures for handling civilian complaints. 237
They complained of dozens of incidents of police mistreatment.238
The citizens alleged that departmental procedures discouraged the fil-
ing of civilian complaints and minimized the consequences of this
misconduct.
239
It was clear from the plain language of the statute, and conceded
by the majority and dissent alike, that § 1983 remedies encompassed
supervisors who "cause[d] to be subjected" someone to a deprivation
of their federal rights.24° Reversing the injunctive relief granted by
the district court, however, the majority in Rizzo objected to the
plaintiffs' failure to show any
affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of
police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by peti-
tioners-express or otherwise-showing their authorization or ap-
proval of such misconduct. Instead, the sole causal connection
found by the District Court between petitioners and the individual
respondents was that in the absence of a change in police discipli-
nary procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to occur, not
with respect to them, but as to the members of the classes they
represented.241
Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist distinguished the
mere failure to act in the face of nothing more than a statistical pat-
tern of incidents (which he did not find to be very frequent in any
case), from more active conduct.242 He was not persuaded that the
234. 423 U.S. 362 (1975).
235. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that although the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for
money damages against "the state" in federal court, officials may nonetheless be sued for injunc-
tive relief which costs the state money, because when the officials violate the Constitution they
act "ultra vires" and therefore no longer represent "the state").
236. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 364-65 n.1.
237. See id. at 364-65.
238. See id. at 366-67.
239. See id. at 368-69.
240. Id. at 370.
241. Id. at 371.
242. See id. at 376.
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statistics alone somehow created a duty to create particular prophylac-
tic measures to deter speculative future abuses. 243 He emphasized
that these defendants had not done anything affirmative to justify in-
junctive relief against them.244
The Rizzo dissent, on the other hand, emphasized the plain lan-
guage of the statute and accepted principles of tort law. Justice Black-
mun observed that § 1983, "[b]y its very words,... reaches not only
the acts of an official, but also the acts of subordinates for whom he is
responsible. '245 He recalled the precepts of Monroe v. Pape, which
advised that the civil rights statute "should be read against the back-
ground of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions. '246 Leaving to another day the questions
of availability of money damages and whether or not liability could be
imposed on supervisors without any consciousness of the wrongs com-
mitted by subordinates, 247 the dissent would have enjoined these offi-
cials from consciously permitting their subordinates to continue
violating the constitution. 248
So much was going on in Rizzo that it is hard to tell what was
dispositive. 249 But along with Monell, it came to stand for the proposi-
tion that § 1983 did not incorporate vicarious liability.250 Moreover,
when Monell reversed the no-government-liability ruling of Monroe,
the Court acknowledged the cogent common law justifications for re-
spondeat superior 251 but explained that it felt bound by the legislative
history of the failed Sherman Amendment. 252 For a provision that did
not pass and was not really on point, the Sherman Amendment has
played an oversized, and perhaps unfortunate, role in the interpreta-
243. See id.
244. See id. at 377.
245. Id. at 384 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. See id. at 385.
248. See id.
249. See, e.g., itt at 372 (the Court's views on standing); id. at 377 (the use of the federal
equity power). In Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983), the Court explained Rizzo as a
decision about standing for equitable relief.
250. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,694 n.58 (1978) (citing Rizzo, 423
U.S. at 370-71) ("[W]e would appear to have decided that the mere right to control without any
control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to
support § 1983 liability.").
251. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94, 694 n.58. The three justifications that the common law ad-
umbrated for imputing liability to the employer were as follows: first is the notion that putting
the cost of accidents on employers makes them more vigilant and helps prevent injuries; second
is an insurance theory which spreads the cost of accidents to the whole community; and third is
the argument that "liability follows the right to control the actions of a tortfeasor." Id. The final
justification apparently was rejected for § 1983 law in Rizzo. See id. at 694 n.58.
252. Id. at 694.
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tion of § 1983. From the slender reed of the legislative history of the
Sherman Amendment,25 3 the Court first concluded in Monroe v. Pape
that § 1983 did not include municipal governments in the definition of
"persons" subject to suit under the statute.254 Revisiting this question
little more than fifteen years later, the Monell Court later concluded
that the same oblique evidence meant something different: Municipal-
ities were § 1983 persons, but they could not be held vicariously liable
simply because they employed a tortfeasor.
255
The Court conceded its conclusions were somewhat indirect:
"Strictly speaking, of course, the fact that Congress refused to impose
vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens does not
conclusively establish that it would similarly have refused to impose
vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees. 2 56 But
this "rejection of the only form of vicarious liability presented to it,"
coupled with another negative, "the absence of any language in § 1983
which can easily be construed to create respondeat superior liability,"
gave rise to a strong "inference that Congress did not intend to im-
pose such liability. ' 25 7 On this shaky foundation, and without ever
coming to terms with the background of tort liability, the Court there-
after built a specialized § 1983 doctrine of municipal liability.
Monell held that local governments are not liable for an injury
solely because they employ a tortfeasor: "Instead, it is when execution
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsi-
ble under § 1983."258 The local government in some way must be the
253. The Sherman Amendment would have created a kind of strict liability along the lines of
other riot acts known to English and American law. "'[Tihe inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish' in which certain acts of [Klan] violence occurred [would have] 'to pay full compensa-
tion"' to the victim or her family. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188 (1961) (quoting CoNo.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871)), overuled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Judgment could be taken against the local government and levied on the
property of any local inhabitant. See id. at 188 n.38. The city, however, could seek indemnifica-
tion against those responsible for the riot. See id. Under the Sherman proposal, "even if [the
municipality] had done everything in its power to curb the riot" by private parties, it would be
held vicariously and strictly liable. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57. The government could then
attempt to recover the judgment from the individuals responsible for the riot. See id. The provi-
sion provoked heated debate over the constitutionality of imposing law enforcement responsibil-
ities on local governments which they did not have under state law. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190.
The amendment was defeated in favor of a provision that extended liability only to persons with
a specific knowledge of the enumerated wrongs. See id. at 189-90.
254. 365 U.S. at 190-91.
255. Monel, 436 U.S. at 692.
256. Id. at 693 n.57.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 694.
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"moving force" of the constitutional violation.25 9 This is the essence
of municipal liability; all the rest is commentary. 26°
As the Court has pursued the implications of Monell for munici-
pal liability, it has created a jurisprudence of what one might call
heightened causation. Governments have no existence apart from
their agents, yet Monell requires a finding that the government itself
was to blame because it was the "moving force" behind the constitu-
tional violation. This has launched an ever-narrowing and more for-
malistic search for actions by policymakers or extremely high-level
defendants whose acts or edicts may be said to represent final author-
ity or for widely persistent custom. 261
The Monell municipal liability quest culminated in the articula-
tion of a standard in a failure-to-train case, City of Canton v. Harris,262
which has had an untoward influence on the supervisory liability cases
that concern sexual abuse by teachers in schools. Harris complained
of defaults that occurred relatively far back in the causal chain.
Although the city's official policy regarding medical treatment for de-
tainees was constitutional on its face, it delegated to the jailer the de-
cision to take any person needing medical treatment to a hospital,
with the permission of his supervisor.263 The Court observed that to
hold the city responsible any time an employee "happened to apply
the policy in an unconstitutional manner" would resurrect respondeat
superior.264 It would make the employer automatically liable just be-
cause it employed a tortfeasor, without regard to the city's role in the
259. Id.
260. "[T]he full contours of municipal liability" were left to be addressed in subsequent
cases. Ild. at 695.
There is a famous story of a fellow named Ben Bag Bag who goes up to the Shammai and
asks him to teach him all that there is to know about Jewish law while standing on one leg, but
the Shammai brushes him off. Then Ben Bag Bag goes up to Hillel, Shammai's great rival (as a
teacher of Jewish law), and Hillel says, "do not do unto others what you would not have them do
unto you; all the rest is commentary." Thanks to my colleague David Dow for teaching me the
full story behind the familiar punchline. See generally IsRAEL KONowrrz, BErr SHAMMAI U-
VErr HILLEL 9-13 (1965).
261. Monell was itself an easy case because the government's action was in the form of a
policy enacted by the Board of Education of the City of New York. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
The Court has found it more difficult to identify the individual official who exercises "final au-
thority." Compare Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), with St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 108
S. Ct. 915 (1988). The High Court has never defined "custom."
262. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). In this case, Mrs. Harris was arrested by the Canton Police Depart-
ment and brought to the station in a daze. She slumped over several times and was left "lying on
the floor to prevent her from falling again." Id at 381. No medical care was summoned. See id.
After she left police custody she ended up in a nearby hospital where she was diagnosed as
suffering from a severe emotional ailment. See id Her § 1983 lawsuit complained that full dis-
cretion to make medical judgments was left to an untrained shift commander. See id. at 381-82.
263. See id. at 386-87.
264. Id. at 387.
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injury.2 65 But according to the jurisprudence that developed under
Monell, that is forbidden in § 1983.266 Mrs. Harris, therefore, relied
on a more remote assertion of causation, claiming that the constitu-
tional injury would never have occurred if the city had trained its jail-
ers in the first place.267 That original failure to train (a policy not
unconstitutional in itself) was alleged to have been the "moving force"
behind the violation of her rights that occurred when the jailer failed
to take her to the hospital.
268
The Court's dilemma in City of Canton was this: How was it to
find that a faceless city's failure to anticipate and act before the situa-
tion even arose, "caused" the injury later inflicted by its low-level em-
ployee? The solution to this problem of remote causation was to
focus instead on culpability, the "degree of fault ... evidenced by the
municipality's inaction."2 69 The Canton Court therefore held that
"the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983
liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indiffer-
ence to the rights of persons with whom the police come into con-
tact. '270 City policymakers must have made "a deliberate ... choice"
among alternatives to follow a course of failing to train its employ-
ees.2 71 This takes a lot-the deficiencies must be so obvious and so
likely to lead to the constitutional injury that the policymakers may be
considered to be "deliberately indifferent" to the probable out-
come.272 In addition to this high degree of fault, the link between the
deficiency in the training and the ultimate injury must be clear.2 73
However, an "otherwise sound" program of training that has been
negligently administered will not trigger municipal liability.2 74
265. See id.
266. See id. at 385.
267. See id. at 387.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 388; see also ii. at 391 ("To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would
open municipalities to unprecedented liability under §1983.").
270. Id. at 388.
271. Id. at 389.
272. Id. at 390. The Court's example demonstrates that "deliberate indifference" is an ex-
tremely stringent standard: Cities who give firearms to police officers in order to stop fleeing
felons, but fail to train them at all in the use of deadly force, would be liable. Id. at 390 n.10.
Alternatively, the city might learn of the obviousness of the need for training from a pattern of
police misbehavior- "It could also be that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often vio-
late constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the
city policymakers ...." Id.




The Court feared that "lesser standards of fault and causation
would open [cities] to unprecedented liability. '275 Cities could always
be criticized for not doing something more to better train their em-
ployees.276 Justice White's majority opinion warned that permitting
this would invite "de facto respondeat superior liability on municipali-
ties-a result we rejected in Monell. '277 In fear of these remote first
causes arising from the failure to train, the Court imposed what
amounted to a heightened causation standard, defined primarily in
terms of culpability.278
From Monell to City of Canton, a specialized doctrine of munici-
pal liability developed which rested on three propositions: (1) because
of the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment, respondeat su-
perior was not possible under § 1983; (2) municipalities could be
found liable only under limited circumstances where their customs or
policies were shown to be the moving force behind the constitutional
violation; and (3) municipalities are liable only for those failures to
train their employees that demonstrate deliberate indifference to the
need for training. This progression arises out of the peculiar tension
in a legal doctrine which rejects the modem common law trend to-
ward vicarious enterprise liability and instead demands personal fault
from a nonperson, a faceless governmental entity. It also, no doubt,
reflects the Court's reluctance to expose municipalities to seemingly
unlimited liability for the misconduct of their many employees. But
this line of cases does not contain the answer to the quite distinct
question of when individual supervisory officials who are personally at
fault may be held liable for constitutional violations committed by
their subordinates.
B. Degrees of Indifference: The Lower Courts Apply City of
Canton's Heightened Causation to Supervisory Liability
Despite the different histories and purposes of municipal liability
and individual supervisory liability, the lower courts have borrowed
the "deliberate indifference" standard of Canton wholesale. Albeit
with significant variations, all the circuits appear to require some form
of deliberate indifference for supervisory liability in the school sex
275. Id.
276. See id. at 392.
277. Id. (citation omitted).
278. See id.
[Vol. 72:747
SECTION 1983 AND SEX ABUSE IN SCHOOLS
abuse cases. 279 The choice of that formula, however, merely invites
confusion of supervisory liability with other issues and also unnecessa-
rily shuts off dialogue with the background of tort liability.
The development of standards for supervisory liability for sexual
abuse by teachers began with Stoneking II, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit's response on remand to the Supreme Court's vaca-
tion of Stoneking L280 The Third Circuit had founded its first Stonek-
ing decision permitting the lawsuit to proceed on a theory of "special
relationship" or an affirmative duty to protect students arising out of
statutory and common law in the state of Pennsylvania. 28' But
DeShaney called into question the existence of such a constitutional
duty outside of circumstances where the state had deprived the victim
of her liberty and was holding her in "custody." Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court did not clarify whether schools qualified as the kind of
state-imposed custody that gives rise to a duty to protect.283
Although the Third Circuit thought that compulsory education
arguably met that requirement of DeShaney, it was unwilling to risk
further delay by relying on the theory of special relationships again.28 4
Instead, the court noted the significant difference between DeShaney
and Stoneking and went off in another direction. While DeShaney in-
volved the failure to protect a young child from beatings by his father,
a private actor in the free world, "Stoneking's [injuries] resulted from
the actions of a state employee."28 5 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court
279. See Larson v. Miller, 55 F.3d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs must demonstrate
deliberate indifference or tacit authorization); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454
(5th Cir. 1994) (deliberate indifference shown by failing to take remedial action); Gates v. Uni-
fied Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs must demonstrate deliber-
ate indifference or tacit authorization); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d
Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference to the abuse); Jane Doe "A" v.
Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990) (plaintiffs must demonstrate deliberate indif-
ference or tacit authorization); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725-26 (3d
Cir. 1989) (Stoneking II) (plaintiff's claim viable where she alleged deliberate indifference); see
also Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 491 (10th Cir. 1995) (complaint failed to show actual knowl-
edge of improper contact with the student). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dis-
missed a case, observing that the complaint did not contain Stoneking allegations that the
"defendants promoted school policies that 'encourag[ed] a climate to flourish where innocent
[children] were victimized."' J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 271-72
(7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 730).
280. Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 725-26.
281. See id. at 723.
282. See ia
283. See id. at 724; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995)
(dicta stating that "we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have
such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional 'duty to protect,' see
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., ... .




repeatedly emphasized the significance of the private nature of the
injury.286 In Stoneking II, however, it was a teacher, a "school district
employee subject to defendants' immediate control," who inflicted the
sexual abuse, often "in the course of his performance of his official
responsibilities, such as during school-sponsored events and trips, and
sometimes on school property."287 The issue, therefore, was not one
of special relationships or duties to protect. Rather, it was the same
issue as in Doe v. Taylor, that is, when may a supervisor be held liable
under § 1983's "subjects, or causes to be subjected" language.
288
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's answer to the super-
visory liability question was that to be liable, the individual defend-
ants, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, must have
established and maintained a policy, custom, or practice that directly
caused the constitutional harm.289 This requirement would be satis-
fied if the defendants communicated condonation by encouraging a
climate in which sexual abuse flourished. 290 The Third Circuit held
that the allegations met the standard with respect to two of the three
defendants.291 Stoneking involved "at least five complaints about sex-
ual assaults of female students by teachers and staff members" be-
tween 1978 and 1982.292 In what perhaps can be seen as evidence of
guilty knowledge, the supervisor kept these allegations in a secret file
at home, rather than recording them in the teachers' personnel files.
293
As a consequence, the court discounted the fact that the young wo-
man who was coerced into a continuing sexual relationship with the
teacher had never complained about the molestation.294 For qualified
286. See id.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 724-25.
289. See id. at 725. The custom or policy language of Stoneking sounds suspiciously like the
criteria that must be satisfied to establish liability against municipalities rather than individual
defendants. See, e.g., Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 1991).
290. See Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 730-31.
291. See id.
292. Id. at 728-29.
293. See id. at 729.
294. See id. Even adult women may not complain about sexual harassment at the time of the
incidents. See generally Susan Gilmore et al., Why Women Are Reluctant to Accuse Powerful
Men, THE SEATrLE TIMEs, March 1, 1992, at A4. Consider Professor Anita Hill's testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning the nomination of now-Justice Clarence
Thomas. When Professor Hill came forward years after the incidents she testified about, there
was much discussion of why she did not say anything at the time of the alleged misconduct. See,
e.g., Edwin Chen, Hill Doesn't Regret Sex Harassment Charges, Los ANr3ELEs TIMES, Oct. 20,
1991, at A-7 (Hill's response to those who questioned her delay in making allegations of harass-
ment). Professor Hill subsequently addressed a breakfast of the Women and Law Section of the
AALS at which she was the honoree. See Ken Meyers, Hill Watch, THE NAT'L L. J., Jan. 20,
1992, at 4. She reminded the audience that however difficult it may have been for her, it was far
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immunity purposes, "it is sufficient that there is adequate evidence
that defendants were on notice of complaints of sexual harassment of
students by teachers and staff at the school. ' 295 A jury could believe
the plaintiffs' testimony that the supervisors "discouraged and mini-
mized reports of sexual misconduct by teachers," thereby showing de-
liberate indifference and "encouraging a climate to flourish where
innocent girls were victimized. '2
96
On the other hand, the Third Circuit let stand the summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants in Black v. Indiana Area School Dis-
trict.297 The superintendent of schools showed that he acted quickly to
investigate the two complaints of sexual molestation he received.298
Even though the supervisor was mistaken and the bus driver had been
abusing several six- to eight-year-old girls, shortcomings in the investi-
gation did not make the supervisor deliberately indifferent. 299
As expressed in Doe v. Taylor, the Fifth Circuit's version of the
test for supervisory liability in teacher sex abuse cases also requires
"deliberate indifference." The court of appeals applied a three-step
test:
(1) the defendant learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sex-
ual behavior by a subordinate pointing plainly toward the conclu-
sion that the subordinate was sexually abusing the student;
(2) the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the
constitutional rights of the student by failing to take action that was
obviously necessary to prevent or stop the abuse; and
(3) such failure caused a constitutional injury to the student.300
In light of this standard, the court held that the girl's allegations
against the principal were sufficient to survive a motion for summary
more intimidating for an economically more vulnerable pink collar worker to complain about
sexual harassment in the workplace. See Notes of author (on file with author). A high school
freshman is in an even worse position to report unwanted sexual attention from a teacher. As a
consequence, supervisory toleration of a climate in which sexual abuse by teachers flourishes
may create the kind of problem identified by the Third Circuit in Stoneking I.
295. Stoneking 11, 882 F.2d at 729.
296. Id. at 730.
297. 985 F.2d 707, 709 (3d Cir. 1993).
298. See id.
299. See id. at 713. In Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 880 F. Supp. 380, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1995), a
district court found deliberate indifference in a case in which a school district actively covered up
the teacher's "pedophilic predilections." Although it took them awhile to respond, the school
district eventually demanded that the teacher resign because of his abuse of a twelve-year-old
child. See id. However, they encouraged him to sign a letter citing "personal reasons" for the
resignation and told the new employer that his performance had been "satisfactory." Id. Four-
teen years later (and after the second school had long since learned about the first incident), the
teacher was caught abusing a nine-year-old child in his new job. See id. at 384-85; see also C.M.
v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (special education student sexu-
ally and physically abused by teacher).
300. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994).
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judgment, but it dismissed claims against the superintendent. 301 Judge
Jolly found that the principal "had certainly received notice of a pat-
tern of inappropriate behavior that had been committed by [Coach]
Stroud that suggested misconduct of a sexual nature. ' 30 2 TWo years
before, the principal had spoken to his subordinate about "being too
friendly" with another female student.303 He had received complaints
from parents, and from a school librarian who described one incident
she witnessed as "child molestation. ' 30 4 Even more important, the
principal "received knowledge" that the Coach had targeted Jane Doe
particularly.30 5 A variety of reports should have alerted him to the
coach's sexual attentions to the girl providing ample time to act before
the abuse escalated to statutory rape.3° As the facts unreeled before
the eyes of the principal in Taylor, his response was to turn against the
complainants and to suppress the complaints:
Lankford demonstrated deliberate indifference to the offensive acts
by failing to take action that was obviously necessary to prevent or
stop Stroud's abuse. When certain parents complained about
Stroud's favoritism, Lankford suggested that their children were
"jealous" of the favorite students. Lankford similarly dismissed the
librarian's report of "child molestation." In perhaps the most strik-
ing example of his apathy, he responded to Brittani B.'s presenta-
tion of the valentine-which he admitted appeared to bear Stroud's
handwriting-by transferring Britani (not Jane Doe) out of
Stroud's class. He never bothered to discuss the valentine incident
with Caplinger, Stroud, Doe, or Doe's parents. He did not record
any of these complaints of inappropriate conduct in Stroud's per-
sonnel file. He did not take the obvious steps of removing Doe
from Stroud's class and directing Stroud to stay away from Doe.30 7
The superintendent, on the other hand, acted (albeit ineffectively) as
soon as he heard about the "potential misconduct by Stroud. '308 He
could not be said to be "deliberately indifferent. '30 9
In contrast to the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits, plaintiffs did not fare as well in the Courts of Appeals for the
301. See id. at 456-58.
302. Id at 456.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 456-57.
306. See id. at 457.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See id. at 458. After the July photograph incident, the superintendent "received notice
of a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test." Id
But he responded immediately, instructing the principal to speak with the coach, investigating
the report personally, meeting with the principal, reprimanding the coach, and warning of the
consequences of any further misconduct. See id. at 457-58.
[Vol. 72:747
SECTION 1983 AND SEX ABUSE IN SCHOOLS
Eighth and Tenth Circuits. These courts of appeals have adopted a
variant of the deliberate indifference standard that includes an extra
step and seems harder to satisfy.310 First, the plaintiff must show that
the supervisor had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts. Second,
deliberate indifference or tacit authorization on the part of the supervi-
sory official is required. Third, the supervisor must fail to take steps to
remediate the misconduct. Fourth, the remedial failure must be a
proximate cause of the constitutional injury.311
In Jane Doe "A" v. Special School District,312 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that there was insufficient summary
judgment evidence that the supervisors had notice of a pattern of un-
constitutional acts by a bus driver of handicapped children. 313 Eleven
handicapped school children brought this unsuccessful § 1983 lawsuit
after the driver pled guilty to charges involving five children.314 The
superintendent had "received a single complaint from a parent that
[the bus driver] had cursed at her ... in front of the children," and
perhaps another complaint that the driver had kissed a child on the
bus.315 The bus supervisors were notified that the driver used profan-
ity, kissed a boy on the bus, and pushed another child.316 One of them
also heard that the driver failed to follow a child's behavior modifica-
tion program and "had kissed and kicked a child and had given him a
'snuggle." 317 The area coordinator knew about some of this and also
about a complaint from parents that the bus driver put his hand down
a boy's pants, pulled down a child's pants, and spanked him.318
Shortly before his arrest for child molestation, it was also reported
that the driver was touching boys' crotches. 31 9
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit apparently agreed
with the district court that no rational trier of fact could conclude that
the area coordinator had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional
310. See Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1995); Larson v. Miller, 55 F.3d
1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1995); Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir.
1993); Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Wilson v. City
of North Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir. 1986)).
311. See Jojola, 55 F.3d at 490 & n.1; Larson, 55 F.3d at 1349 (citing Jane Doe "A", 901 F.2d
at 646); Gates, 996 F.2d at 1041; Jane Doe "A", 901 F.2d at 645 (citing Wilson, 801 F.2d at 322).
312. 901 F.2d 642.
313. See id at 646.
314. See id. at 643.







acts. 320 Instead, the lower court concluded that the incidents reported
to the bus supervisors only concerned common law torts.321 The court
of appeals ruled that the area coordinator's failure to respond to the
parents' complaints was "at most... negligence. ' '32 Such negligence,
the Eighth Circuit opined, "does not implicate fourteenth amendment
protections. ' 323 That the driver turned out to be "a sexual reprobate"
after the fact should not result in the imposition of liability. 324 "Mea-
sured against the deliberate indifference-official policy standard of lia-
bility," the plaintiffs' case against the individual supervisors did not
survive summary judgment.325
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was equally un-
moved in Larson v. Miller.326 A bus driver sexually assaulted a nine-
year-old handicapped student with minimal communicative abili-
ties.327 The driver had been hired with no background check.328 The
child initially reported that the driver asked her "whether she had
been breast fed and whether she was wearing silk panties. ' 329 Super-
visors warned him not to make inappropriate comments, but left him
in charge of her bus.330 Throughout the fall, she became withdrawn,
and finally told her mother that the driver had fondled her vaginal
area. 331 The immediate response of school officials to her parents' re-
port was to warn them that they could be in trouble for slander.332
The court of appeals in Larson found it dispositive that there had
been only one previous complaint, much less than "far more extensive
records of unheeded prior complaints [found] insufficient to constitute
a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. '333
320. See id. at 644, 646.
321. See id.
322. Id. at 646.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 646-47.
325. Id. at 647. Summary judgment was also entered in favor of the defendant school dis-
trict. See id. at 646. To prevail against the District, plaintiffs would have had to show the exist-
ence of a widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the District's
employees; deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of such conduct by the District's poli-
cymaking officials after notice to the officials of such misconduct; and injury from acts pursuant
to the District's custom, i.e., the custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
See id.
326. 55 F.3d 1343 (8th Cir. 1995).
327. See id. at 1346-48.
328. See id. at 1347. A background check would have revealed that the driver had been
arrested but not convicted for sexual abuse of his step-daughter. See id. at 1348.




333. Id. at 1349.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's requirement of a
pattern of violations also characterized the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit's approach in Gates v. Unified School District No. 449334
and Jojola v. Chavez.335 The Gates court distinguished Stoneking II,
where the principal had "received, repressed and concealed at least
five complaints. ' 336 In Jojola, the complaint alleged that a parent told
the principal that the custodian drilled a hole in the wall of the girls'
locker room so that he could observe them.337 The plaintiffs also al-
leged that "rumors had circulated at the school concerning [the custo-
dian's] improper sexual behavior. '338 Another parent supposedly
"complained to a previous principal of the high school that [the custo-
dian] had made sexual comments to girls at the school. ' 339 The peti-
tion stated that he was removed from his job as a bus driver "because
of inappropriate behavior with a preteen female student, and [was]
transferred to the high school after he had unhooked brassieres of
junior high school girls." 340 But the court of appeals found that four
334. 996 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1993).
335. 55 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 1995); see also, Doe v. Claiborne, 103 F.3d 495, 513 (6th Cir. 1996)
(the supervisory defendants were "simply not confronted with such a widespread pattern of con-
stitutional violations that their actions or inactions amounted to a deliberate indifference to the
danger of [the teacher] sexually abusing students"). In what is perhaps an understatement, the
court conceded that the defendants' actions "left a lot to be desired." Id. The school superinten-
dent had received notice from DHS that the teacher was alleged to be sexually absuing nine
different girls at a middle school. See id. at 502. Upon the advice of DHS, the teacher was
removed from student contact for the balance of the school year. See id. Subsequently, DHS
concluded that four of the charges were "founded." See id. After DHS negotiated what was
termed a "pretrial agreement" with the teacher in which they agreed not to pursue criminal
proceedings against him themselves or to seek the suspension of his license, a high school princi-
pal sought out the teacher and hired him to teach and coach without further consultation or
consideration of the contents of the lengthy personnel file. See id. The Board confirmed the
rehiring. See id. at 503. The principal thereafter heard rumors, received complaints, and ob-
served inappropriate behavior himself, but he relied on a further DHS investigation that found
the last complaint "unfounded." See i,£ Reluctantly, he acquiesced to a request to allow Doe to
keep score for the coach's team. See id. It was after this that the harassment and abuse of the
14-year-old girl began which culminated in statutory rape. See id. The teacher ultimately pled
guilty to criminal charges and the girl required psychological counseling. See id. at 501.
336. Gates, 996 F.2d at 1042. The Gates principal knew about an incident in which another
high-school girl, Cheryl Parker, "was infatuated with [the teacher] and ... [the teacher] had
encouraged her." Id. While inappropriate, that incident did not rise to a violation of Parker's
constitutional rights. See id. The principal, however, had personally attended the executive ses-
sion of the school board in 1985 at which allegations about an inappropriate "romantic" relation-
ship between the teacher and Parker were aired by her tearful father. See id. at 1037, 1039.
Even though the principal conceded that it was obvious that they were involved because Parker
married the teacher as soon as she turned 18, the principal continued to evaluate the teacher
highly. See id. at 1039. Moreover, he testified that he would not hold the "romantic" involve-
ment with a student in the school against the teacher on his job. See id.






incidents and other rumors over nineteen years of employment were
insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate "the requisite pattern of
behavior" to satisfy the notice requirement and to impose liability.341
As a parent, I find it strange that a school employee can merely
be transferred to a new field of operations for inappropriate sexual
contact with children or that the comments in Larson do not raise a
red flag when an employee has complete control of a profoundly
handicapped child in his bus. The reluctance to bring these issues out,
however, is familiar to me from my own experience.3' 2 Supervisors
may not believe children, may not like to talk about such things, or
may fear that they would face a lawsuit from the affected employee.
343
"Deliberate indifference" is an unnecessarily confusing and limiting
standard for supervisory liability in general. Moreover, some courts
of appeals have applied their versions of that formula in a particularly
unsatisfactory fashion.3 "4 The confusion is introduced by the use of
the same language of "deliberate indifference" for three separate is-
sues: (1) the state of mind demanded by the underlying constitutional
right that is being enforced; (2) the degree of fault required by § 1983
to prove the heightened causation necessary for some claims of munic-
ipal liability; and (3) the standard for liability of individual supervisory
officials under the statute.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's Jane Doe "A" opin-
ion provides an example of the first confusion, which conflates the
underlying constitutional right at stake with the statutory element that
allocates responsibility between defendants. Citing Daniels and Da-
vidson, the court of appeals mistakenly argued that supervisory liabil-
ity required "deliberate indifference" because the Fourteenth
341. Id. The court compared the number of incidents to a case in which the district was the
defendant. In Thelma D. ex rel. Delores A. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 1991),
five complaints scattered over 16 years did not comprise a "persistent and widespread pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct" sufficient to give notice to policymakers and to create governmen-
tal liability.
342. I served as "Ombudsperson" for the University of Houston Sexual Harassment Griev-
ance Board and as a Member of the University of Houston Sexual Harassment Policy and Proce-
dure Implementation Committee, with responsibilities for drafting, disseminating, and
monitoring the effectiveness of sexual harassment policies and procedures on campus. I was also
a member of the University of Houston Sexual Assault Task Force.
343. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1993) (school
board thought "'the testimony of a little girl' was not enough to hold a hearing in the face of a
teacher's denials"). After the teacher in Gonzalez was transferred to another school, he mo-
lested another child and ultimately was convicted on criminal charges arising out of the second
incident. See id. at 749-50. For the fear of litigation, see Larson v. Miller, 55 F.3d 1343, 1347 (8th
Cir. 1995) (school official's response to parents' complaint was to warn them that they could be
sued for slander).
344. See, e.g., Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990).
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Amendment cannot be violated by mere negligence.345 It is possible
that the Supreme Court ultimately will decide that "deliberate indif-
ference" is the minimum state of mind necessary under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court has already done so for the Eighth
Amendment, ruling in Farmer v. Brennan346 that the proscription on
"cruel and unusual punishment" may be transgressed if prison officials
display "deliberate indifference" to risk of harm to inmates.34 7 The
crux of the constitutional violation in the teacher sex abuse cases,
however, goes beyond deliberate indifference: The claim is that the
teacher arbitrarily and capriciously deprived the student of her consti-
tutional right to bodily integrity.348 Thus, there is no danger in these
cases that the Fourteenth Amendment will be violated by mere negli-
gence. Accordinly, Daniels, Davidson, and even Farmer are
irrelevant.
While each constitutional provision imposes its own state of mind
requirement,34 9 § 1983 itself does not incorporate a separate state of
mind element. 35 0 As discussed above, however, the Court in City of
Canton decided that under its construction of the statute, municipal
defendants could not be held liable for their failures to train without a
showing of "deliberate indifference." This use of "deliberate indiffer-
ence" is the second source of confusion introduced into the law of
supervisory liability.3 5 ' In some of the cases, this confusion produces
an undue emphasis on repetition or a pattern of unconstitutional be-
havior. Municipal liability for a failure to train demands two requi-
sites. First, like any claim against a local government defendant, the
345. See id. at 646 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986)).
346. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (failure to protect inmate from assault and homosexual rape).
347. See id. at 1974-79. But the Court redefined the Eighth Amendment's "deliberate indif-
ference" in Farmer to make it a clearly subjective rather than an objective test. See id. at 1979.
Justice Souter's opinion required more than negligence, but less than deliberate purpose to cause
the harm. See id. at 1979-80. Rather, the Court chose subjective recklessness, as used in criminal
law, as the appropriate standard. See id. at 1980. This means that constitutional liability in a
failure to protect an inmate claim cannot be premised on obviousness or constructive notice;
prison officials must recklessly disregard a risk of harm of which they were aware. See id.
348. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
349. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.8 (1989); Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329-31.
350. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels, 474 U.S.
327.
351. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was at least aware of the distinctions between
individual liability and the deliberate indifference standard for municipal failure to train adopted
in City of Canton. See Doe, 15 F.3d at 454. Nonetheless, the court borrowed the "deliberate
indifference" standard from a case involving liability against the school board alone. See id.
(citing Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 753-60 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing judg-
ment against school district that left teacher in the classroom after complaints about his sexual
misbehavior with elementary school children)).
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municipality is only liable if it engaged in a custom or policy of consti-
tutional violation.35 2 "Custom" requires a "continuing, widespread,
persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental
entity's employees" which policymaking officials ignored.
353 This cus-
tom, moreover, must be the moving force behind the constitutional
violation.354 On top of that, according to City of Canton, to establish
§ 1983 causation, a failure to train claim against a municipality must
also demonstrate a high degree of culpability on the part of city offi-
cials, i.e., deliberate indifference.
355
Some of the courts of appeals have acknowledged distinctions be-
tween proof of municipal custom liability and individual defendant lia-
bility,35 6 contrasting a "continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees"
to "a pattern of unconstitutional acts" committed by subordinates.
357
Yet because of the "deliberate indifference" standard, it is not clear
that this works out any different in practice. The number and persis-
tency of the complaints greatly influence whether or not individual
supervisory liability may be found.358 This seems especially true in
circuits that express the supervisory deliberate indifference test in four
steps, with the first requiring notice of a pattern of unconstitutional
behavior and the second and third elements separating proof of delib-
erate indifference from a failure to take sufficient remedial action.35 9
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Taylor asked only that the su-
pervisor have notice of "facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual be-
havior.., pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinate
was sexually abusing the student. '3 60 It also telescoped the two mid-
dle steps into one, thereby assuming that the failure "to take action
352. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
353. Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 932-33 (8th Cir. 1991) (five complaints of
sexual abuse lodged against teacher over a 16-year period did not comprise persistent and wide-
spread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct, such as would warrant holding school board lia-
ble for failure to act before occurrence of misconduct).
354. See id.
355. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
356. See, e.g., Larson v. Miller, 55 F.3d at 1343, 1349-50 (8th Cir. 1995); Gates v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 1993); Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901
F.2d 643, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1990); cf. Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.
1993) (against school district only); Thelma D., 934 F.2d at 933 (against school board only).
357. See, e.g., Jane Doe "A", 901 F.2d at 645-46.
358. See, e.g., Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 1995). The Jojola court emphasized
that four incidents and other rumors about the defendant custodiam was not enough of a pattern
by contrast to the numerous complaints in Doe v. Taylor. Id. at 491.
359. See, e.g., Larson, 55 F.3d at 1349; Gates, 996 F.2d at 1041; Jane Doe "A ", 901 F.2d at 645.
360. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994).
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that was obviously necessary to prevent or stop the abuse" constituted
deliberate indifference per se.361
I am not convinced that the formulas adopted by the Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits respectively
explain the different results in the circuits so far. But the embrace of
"deliberate indifference" may adversely influence courts that require
too much from the facts of teacher sexual abuse cases. Many of the
decisions seem to demand evidence of a pattern of misconduct or that
the supervisor actively suppressed or covered up the complaints. This
is unresponsive to the realities of sexual abuse by school personnel. A
number of these cases involved ample notice of inappropriate behav-
ior with children. 362 At the same time, the ultimate injury is almost
always performed secretively. For a variety of reasons, asymmetrical
incentives operate on supervisors. They have more reason to avoid
the issue than they have to uncover misconduct. As a result, they may
tolerate a climate in which sexual abuse flourishes. Such supervisory
default further compounds the harm of the constitutional violation. It
demonstrates to school children, who are subject to their first experi-
ence with governmental authority, that potential abuses are not taken
seriously. Certain misbehavior becomes so accepted and unremark-
able that the children may not even recognize it as abuse.363 Perhaps
there is only a nuance of difference at issue here, but once on notice of
suspicious facts, supervisors should lose for failing to investigate fur-
ther and remediate, and not just if their actions are totally outrageous.
Supervisory liability is individual liability. It has little to do with
the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment, a critical concern
361. See id. The final component of both tests was the same: the supervisory failure proxi-
mately caused the injury to the student. See, e.g., id.; Jane Doe "A", 901 F.2d at 645.
362. In one instance, the problem teacher even had a well-known sobriquet, "Lester the
Molester." See Nan D. Stein, Sexual Harassment in Schools: Administrators Must Break the Cas-
ual Approach to Objectionable Behavior, 50 ScH. ADMIm. 14, 15 (1993) (reporting deposition
testimony in J. 0. v. Alton Community Unit School District).
363. A Title IX case involving student-to-student harassment demonstrates how children
may not even recognize sexual abuse if it is tolerated by authority figures. In Mennone v.
Gordon, a girl was subjected to almost daily insults and assaults by another student who made
remarks about her breasts, grabbed her hair, legs, breasts, and buttocks and threatened to rape
her. 889 F. Supp. 53, 54-55 (D. Conn. 1995). This was all done in the presence of the teacher,
who refused to help. See id. at 55. But in May of the academic year, a rape crisis counselor came
to address a class and for the first time the girl learned that the behavior was inappropriate and
perhaps criminal. See id. Then and only then did she go to school guidance counselors. See id.
School administrators referred her to a rape crisis center where she finally learned that she could
file criminal charges with the police. See id. In the face of the school's continuing inaction, the
girl eventually had to leave school in order to avoid her harasser. See id. As bad as this situation
is, how much worse is it when it is the state-sanctioned authority figure inflicting the abuse and a
principal or other supervisor turns a blind eye to it?
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for the Court's interpretation of municipal liability.364 Unlike munici-
palities, moreover, supervisors enjoy qualified immunity.365 The City
of Canton's "deliberate indifference" standard is thus both confusing
and unnecessary in supervisory liability law. Instead, the guidelines
for individual defendants should be derived in the first instance from
Monell's gloss on Rizzo: Liability may not be imputed to individual
defendants just because as supervisors they have a nominal right to
control the actions of their subordinate.366 They must be personally
responsible through their own supervisory defaults.367 Stated this
way, the principle has two big advantages. It avoids confusion with
the tortured interpretations of municipal liability. It also creates the
opportunity at last for appropriate dialogue with the background of
tort liability.
C. Personal Responsibility In the Background of Tort Liability
The dialogue is possible because, despite the modem tort trend
toward enterprise liability, 368 personal responsibility doctrines persist.
Thus, it is possible to look to the common law directly, and to Title
VII and Title IX, two contemporary civil rights statutes that have been
held to incorporate common law approaches, to inform our interpre-
tation of § 1983 and to do so without transgressing the older civil
rights statute's requirement of personal fault.
Admittedly, vicarious liability dominates state tort law today.
The California Supreme Court recently explained again why it fa-
vored the doctrine of respondeat superior: Holding the master strictly
liable for the wrongs of the servant creates incentives for deterrence,
gives greater assurance of full compensation to the victim through
cost-spreading insurance principles, and ensures that the business will
bear the costs arising from its own enterprise. 369 Under this doctrine
364. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 666-67 (1978).
365. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982) (individual officials retain quali-
fied immunity unless conduct violates clearly established law); Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (municipalities do not have immunity).
366. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n.58 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)).
367. See id.
368. On the trend toward enterprise liability, see Verkerke, supra note 178, at 299 n.69 (cit-
ing George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985)). Verkerke describes the doc-
trine, "[i]n its most rudimentary form, [as a demand] that the law impose on each employer all
costs that are attributable to its enterprise." Id. at 308.
369. See Mary M. v. Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Cal. 1991) (permitting vicarious liabil-
ity to be imposed on city for rape by police officer of woman he stopped). See also Monell, 436
U.S. at 693-94, 694 n.58 (articulating three common-law justifications for vicarious employer
liability: (1) the deterrence idea that imputing the cost of accidents to employers will make them
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.of enterprise liability, however, limits are imposed through the "scope
of employment" requirement. 370 The employer is not liable if the em-
ployee's conduct falls outside the scope of employment and has noth-
ing to do with the enterprise.
As a result of the development of vicarious liability, the scope of
operation of personal responsibility doctrines is somewhat shrunken.
They may even be viewed as auxiliary theories that serve as an alter-
native vehicle to reach the employer when the low-level employee's
tort is held to be outside the scope of employment. 371 But personal
fault can make a big difference to the result, in the common law, and
especially in the law of hostile environment sexual harassment that
has developed under Title VII and Title IX.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts both reflect theories of negligent hiring, negligent reten-
tion, and negligent supervision which impose liability on supervisors
who are personally at fault. 372 Such supervisors are not automatically
responsible for the injury inflicted by subordinates. Instead, the su-
pervisor herself must have violated a duty of care.373 The key to these
cases is foreseeability and causation. Hiring claims require knowledge
more vigilant and help prevent injuries; (2) the insurance theory that spreads the cost of acci-
dents to the whole community; and (3) the idea that "liability follows the right to control the
actions of a tortfeasor").
370. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1344.
371. See Verkerke, supra note 178, at 305.
372. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1958) (master not liable for
torts of his servants committed outside the scope of their employment unless the master was
negligent or reckless); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (principal liable for harm
resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless in the supervision of the activity). Puni-
tive damages may be awarded against a master because of an act done by an agent if "the princi-
pal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act," if "the agent was
unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him," if "the
agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting within the scope of employment,"
or if "the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 909 (1979).
373. See, e.g., Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587,
592, 598 (Kan. 1991) (material issue of fact whether school and school bus service should have
foreseen risk of sexual molestation as a result of their employment and retention of the "out of
control" driver who allegedly molested six-year-old Downs-syndrome girl). The Kansas court
ruled that in a negligent retention and supervision claim against the employer, "liability results
not because of the employer-employee relationship, but because the employer had reason to
believe that an undue risk of harm to others would exist as a result of the employment of the
alleged tortfeasor." Id. at 598; see also Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 280 (N.H. 1995) (cause of
action for hiring or retaining an employee that the employer knew or should have known was
unfit for the job so as to create a danger of harm to third persons "is distinct from one based
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior and is a theory of direct, not vicarious, liability"); cf.
Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 565 (D.C. 1984) (finding no issue of fact raised
where only allegation was that school was negligent to let special education program director
meet one-on-one with blind, deaf, and mute student; and where there was no evidence that the
school knew he posed any greater danger than any other teacher).
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of the dangerous propensities of the employee given the type of job.
After hiring, a failure to respond to facts that indicate a special danger
posed by the employee may lead to negligent retention or supervision
causes of action.
Like contemporary common law theories of enterprise liability,
the modern civil rights statutes, Title VII (prohibiting discrimination
in employment) and Title IX (prohibiting discrimination in federally-
aided education), focus primarily on the liability of the employer or
the institution. 374 However, personal responsibility becomes an issue
even in these cases because of a distinction between the two kinds of
sexual harassment prohibited by federal law. In Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson 375 the Supreme Court held that two forms of sexual harass-
ment violate Title VII's prohibitions against workplace equality: (1)
quid pro quo, and (2) hostile work environment harassment.376 In
quid pro quo harassment an agent of the employer demands sexual
favors in return for more favorable treatment in the workplace or
threatens retaliation if sex is denied.377 But the Meritor Court found
that "[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environ-
ment for members of one sex" also can be an "arbitrary barrier to
374. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for any "employer" to en-
gage in certain prohibited employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). "Employer" is
defined as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more em-
ployees. . ., and any agent of such a person." Id. at § 2000e(b). Since the Civil Rights Act of
1991 became effective, in cases where "intentional discrimination" is shown (i.e., not disparate
impact), in addition to equitable relief such as reinstatement, the plaintiff now can recover com-
pensatory and even punitive damages (which are capped according to a schedule related to the
size of the employer) against the "respondent" in a Title VII lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(1994). It is not even clear whether any action may be had against individual defendants at all.
The court continued to be split as to whether managers and superivsors may be found individu-
ally liable as "agents" of the employer. See Rebecca Harmer White, Vicarious and Personal
Liability for Employment Descrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509 (1996); Davida H. Isaacs, "It's
Nothing Personal"-But Should It Be?: Finding Agent Liability for Violation of the Federal Em-
ployment Discrimination Statutes, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 505 (1996); Comment,
Workplace Sexual Harassment and Individual Liability, 69 TEMP. L. REv.303 (1996).
Title IX is a funding statute which the Supreme Court held gives rise to a private right of
action for money damages for sex discrimination in federally-aided education. See Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681. The dam-
ages actions brought since Franklin typically seek recovery against the school district. A number
of courts have ruled that there is no individual defendant claim available under Title IX. See,
e.g., Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd on other
grounds, Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Oona R.-S v.
Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Title IX may be enforced
against individual defendants through § 1983); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D.
Conn. 1995) (Title IX applicable to individual defendants "who exercise some level of control
over the program or activity that the discrimination occurs under.").
375. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
376. See id. at 65.
377. See id.
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sexual equality at the workplace. ' 378 It recognized that a man or a
woman should not be required to "run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living
.... ,379 To be actionable, "[hostile environment] sexual harassment
.. must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."' 38 0 The allegations in Meritor "which include[d] not only per-
vasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious
nature" were sufficient to state a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment. 38
1
Meritor's recognition of hostile environment sexual harassment
introduced a distinction which has made a difference in the lower
courts' interpretation of Title VII. The Supreme Court refused to give
a definitive answer about whether employers would be strictly and
vicariously liable for sexual harassment by supervisors, or whether
some other rule would obtain.3s2 In Meritor, a vice-president of the
bank was the harasser and the employer allegedly had no notice of his
misconduct. 38 3 This lack of notice led the district court to conclude
that the bank was absolved from liability for the actions of its
vice-president. 3s4 The court of appeals, on the other hand, "took the
opposite view. ' 38 5 It held that "an employer is strictly liable for a hos-
tile environment created by a supervisor's sexual advances, even
though the employer neither knew nor reasonably could have known
of the alleged misconduct. ''3s6
The Meritor Supreme Court rejected the views of the district
court and the court of appeals alike and instead invoked common law
agency principles:
We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule
on employer liability, but we do agree with the EEOC that Con-
gress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this
area. While such common-law principles may not be transferable in
all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "em-
ployer" to include any "agent" of an employer, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts
378. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
379. Id.
380. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
381. Id. The plaintiff alleged that her supervisor subjected her to unwanted sexual inter-
course over a long period of time, some of it assaultive. See id at 60.
382. See id. at 72.
383. See id. at 59, 62.
384. See id. at 69.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
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of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable
for sexual harassment by their supervisors. See generally Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency §§ 219-237 (1958). For the same reason,
absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that
employer from liability.
387
This instruction in Meritor means that the lower courts were told to
look to the common law of agency for resolution of the unanswered
employer liability question. Furthermore, the Court clearly indicated
that it would not approve strict or vicarious liability as the governing
principle.388 As reflected in the passages of the Restatement refer-
enced by the Court, some kind of personal responsibility would be
required under some circumstances. 38
9
Adhering to the Supreme Court's instruction that they look to
the common law as a guide, lower courts have reached a veritable
babel of conclusions. 390 But those decisions make distinctions which
emphasize the need to find personal fault for some claims. Post-Mer-
itor rulings hold that although the employer is absolutely liable for
quid pro quo sexual harassment by a supervisor,391 pure hostile envi-
387. Id. at 72.
388. Id. The Court indicated that a course must be steered between the Scylla of excusing
the bank for its supervisor's misconduct so long as it had some kind of grievance policy in place,
and the Charybidis of "entirely disregard[ing] agency principles and impos[ing] absolute liability
on employers for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particular
case." Id. at 73.
389. The Restatement contemplates two basic circumstances: either the servant committing
the tort is acting within the scope of employment, or the employee is acting outside the scope of
employment. While the master is responsible for all torts in the first instance, there are signifi-
cant limits to the employer's responsibilitiy under the latter situation:
(1) A master is subject to libaility for the torts of his servants committed while acting in
the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a nondelegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relationship.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). Sections 228-237 define when a servant's
torts are within the scope of employment. See id. at §§ 228-37.
390. See, e.g., Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for "Hostile
Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an Appropriate
Standard, 225 U. MEM. L. REV. 667, 670 (1995) (surveying the circuits).
391. See, e.g., Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 102 F.3d 848, 859-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
liability without notice to employer for quid pro quo sexual harassment where high level supervi-
sor's conduct at the workplace, during working hours, directed toward an employee over whom
he had substantial authority, was within the scope of employment, although declining to charac-
terize this as "strict liability").
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ronment harassment claims are different.392 The circuits split over
whether the employer may ever be held liable for the supervisor's hos-
tile environment harassment unless the corporate defendant knew or
should have known of the supervisor's actions and failed to take ac-
tion which was reasonably calculated to end the harassment. 393 The
developing consensus, however, seems to be "notice liability," a type
of negligence standard which requires that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment in order to be held responsible
for hostile environment harassment perpetrated by either a supervisor
or by a lower-level employee. 394
392. See Andrade v. Mayfair Mgmt., Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996) (employer liable
only if the employer knew or should have known of harassment by supervisor or any other
employee and failed to take remedial action) (citing Spicer v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 66
F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc)); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995)
(employer will be liable if a supervisor "uses 'his actual or apparent authority to further the
harassment, or if [the supervisor] was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the
existence of the agency relationship"'; but where "a low-level supervisor does not rely on his
supervisory authority to carry out the harassment, or a co-employee of the plaintiff is the alleged
harasser, an employer will generally not be liable 'unless the employer either provided no rea-
sonable avenue of complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it' (citations
omitted)); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (contrasting employment
decisions based on an employee's response to a supervisor's sexual overtures to a discriminato-
rily abusive work environment created by a supervisor); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d
446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) (employer liable for sexual harassment by coworker "only if he knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action which was
'reasonably calculated' to end the harassment") (citation omitted); Pierce v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir. 1994) ("In a hostile.., environment claim, the determi-
nation of whether an employer is liable for its supervisor's actions depends on (1) whether the
supervisor's harassing actions were foreseeable or fell within the scope of his employment and
(2) even if they were, whether the employer responded adequately and effectively to negate
liability.") (citing Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding but
for quid pro quo harassment the employer is strictly liable under a respondeat superior theory));
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (strict liability for quid
pro quo cases, but in a pure hostile environment setting, liability imposed only "where the corpo-
rate defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt reme-
dial action against the supervisor").
393. See, e.g., Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (strict liability for quid pro quo, but in
a pure hostile environment setting, liability imposed only "where the corporate defendant knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action against the
supervisor").
394. See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451 (employer liable for sexual harassment by coworker only if he
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action which
was reasonably calculated to end the harassment); Pierce, 40 F.3d at 803 (in a hostile environ-
ment claim, the determination of whether an employer is liable for its supervisor's conduct de-
pends on: (1) whether the supervisor's harassing actions were foreseeable or fell within the scope
of his employment; and (2) if they were, whether the employer responded adequately and effec-
tively to negate liability. For quid pro quo harassment, the employer is strictly liable under a
respondeat superior theory); Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316 (strict liability for quid pro quo; but where
supervisor is guilty of a pure hostile environment charge, there is liability only where the corpo-
rate defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt reme-
dial action against the supervisor).
Professor Verkerke uses the term "notice liability" to describe these developments in Title
VII. See Verkerke, supra note 178, at 277. For criticisms of the way this notice liability standard
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When sex abuse goes to school, the decisions get even more con-
fusing.395 But most courts apply Title VII agency principles and read
this same notice requirement into Title IX claims of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment in schools.396 Title IX was first held to create
is developing, see id.; Justin S. Weddle, Title VII Sexual Harassment: Recognizing an Employer's
Non-Delegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile Workplace, 95 COLUMBIA L. REV. 724 (1995).
Some courts distinguish notice liability from those rare instances in which a supervisor uses
his actual or apparent authority to accomplish the harassment, thus imposing vicarious liability
on the employer. See supra note 392.
395. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit observed that the "divergence of views"
about the appropriate standard to support liability against the school district or officials for sex-
ual harassment "stems in part from the factual disparity in the cases." Kinman v. Omaha Pub.
Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996). The variations include the type of discrimination
alleged ("hostile environment, quid pro quo, sexual abuse, discriminatory hiring/firing or some
combination"), and "the identity of the perpetrators and victims (teacher/student harassment,
student/student harassment, or school official/teacher harassment)." Id. But even courts facing
similar fact patterns do not reach the same conclusions. See id. This is not the place to attempt
to resolve the intricacies of Title IX.
396. See Doe v. Claiborne, 103 F.3d 495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying Title VII agency prin-
ciples to resolve teacher/student hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title IX);
Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469 (applying Title VII "knew or should have known" standard of institu-
tional liability for hostile environment sexual harassment to cases involving teacher's hostile
environment harassment of a student under Title IX); Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ.,
892 F. Supp. 746, 755 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1995) (although notice is required, where supervisor engages
in quid pro quo harassment, the notice element is automatically satisfied); Patricia H. v. Berke-
ley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1291, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (looking to Title VII to
analyze claims that continuing presence of a teacher who had sexually molested two students
created hostile environment in the school district for those girls; district's liability conditioned on
their knowing failure to act); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Kan. 1993) (as in
Title VII, negligence or recklessness generally will provide basis of liability for hostile environ-
ment harassment of beauty school student by teacher). Without actually determining the issue
conclusively, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that "at the very least" a student
who claims to have been sexually harassed must show that the school "knew or should have
known about the harassment and yet failed to take appropriate remedial action" in order to
meet the standard that the "[district] itself intentionally discriminated on the basis of the plain-
tiff's sex." Deborah 0. v. Lake Cen. Sch. Corp., No. 94-3804, 1995 LEXIS 19194, at *10 (7th Cir.
July 21, 1995).
Some courts, however, require more. After evading the issue of the applicable standard in
Canutillo Independent School District v. Leija, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
ruled in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District, that Title VI rather than Title VII is
the appropriate analogue for Title IX. Compare Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d
393, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1996) (claim fails even under assumption that standards akin to Title VII or
Restatement § 219 apply), with Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 657 (5th
Cir. 1997) (rejecting the Title VII constructive-notice standard which is essentially grounded in
negligence in favor of a required showing of "actual intentional discrimination on the part of the
school district"). Rosa H. reversed a contrary ruling by the lower court. See Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir.
1997) (school district liable for teacher's sexual abuse on a negligence standard; the school dis-
trict must have either actual or constructive notice of the sexual harassment or abuse and negli-
gently fail to take prompt, effective remedial measures); see also Nelson v. Almont Community
Schs., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (applying Title VII intentional discrimination
standard); Howard v. Board of Educ., 876 F. Supp. 959, 973-74 (N.D. I1. 1995) (common-law
agency principles under Title VII do not apply to Title IX and school board only liable if it had
direct knowledge or involvement); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867, 876 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (for
school board to be liable, it had to have taken part in and failed to stop the molestation by
security guards).
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a private right of action in 1992. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub-
lic Schools, 397 the Supreme Court ruled that a high school student who
was subjected to sexual harassment and "coercive intercourse" by a
teacher (yet another coach) could sue for money damages for her Title
IX claim. 398 The school teacher's abuse of the student constituted dis-
crimination on the basis of sex just as surely as harassment of a
subordinate by a supervisor violated Title VII in an employment
context.399
Impressed by the secretive nature of sexual abuse in schools,
some courts may be willing to impute vicarious liability to the school
district for the teacher's intentional misconduct.4° On the other ex-
For different approaches, see Bolon v. Rolla Public Schools, 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (E.D.
Mo. 1996), which held that intentional discrimination by teachers is imputed to the school dis-
trict under the principles of respondeat superior, regardless of whether hostile environment,
demand for sexual favors, or removal of females from classroom; and Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa
City Schools, 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1459-61 (N.D. Cal. 1995), which enforced Title IX against indi-
vidual defendants through § 1983.
397. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
398. See id. at 63, 65-66, 76. She also alleged that although the school district became aware
of and investigated the teacher's harassment, "teachers and administrators took no action to halt
it and discouraged Franklin from pressing charges against Hill [the harasser.]" Id. at 63 (altera-
tion in the original). The teacher resigned on the condition that all matters pending against him
be dropped and the school thereafter closed its investigation. See id. at 64. Franklin brought a
complaint to the Office of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education ("OCR")
before filing a federal lawsuit. See id. at 65 n.3. But no relief was available from that office due
to the fact that the teacher had resigned and the district had implemented a grievance procedure.
See id. at 65. After the termination of the OCR investigation, Franklin filed her federal lawsuit
seeking money damages. See id. at 65 n.3.
The Supreme Court analyzed the available remedies which it considered distinct from the
issue already determined by prior cases that Title IX creates an implied right of action. See id. at
65-66. The Court implicitly recognized that Franklin's allegations amounted to a violation of
federally guaranteed rights under Title IX. See id. at 66-67.
The Court further refused to apply Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981), which limited damages for unintentional violations of Spending Clause
provisions. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74. The Franklin Court distinguished the concern of Pen-
nhurst, where the recipient of federal funds had no notice of unintentional violations, from the
intentional violations alleged in Franklin:
This notice problem does not arise in a case such as this, in which intentional discrimi-
nation is alleged. Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a supervisor sexu-
ally harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discrimi-
nate[s]' on the basis of sex." We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher
sexually harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal mon-
eys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.
Id. at 74-75 (citation omitted).
399. See Franklin, 563 U.S. at 74-75.
400. See Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1427-29. But the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed a similar ruling by a Texas court and ultimately held in another case that proof of
intentional discrimination is required to hold the school liable. Compare Leija v. Canutillo In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D. Tex. 1995), with Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 402-03. See
also Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 656 (Title IX must be interpreted like Title VI, requiring proof of
intentional discrimination by the institution receiving federal funds).
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treme, some courts may demand proof of actual intentional discrimi-
nation on the part of the school. 4°1 But many courts follow the signals
in Franklin and borrow Title VII standards for Title IX lawsuits, creat-
ing a "knew or should have known" standard for hostile environment
sexual harassment in schools.40
2
On March 13, 1997, the Office of Civil Rights released a final
Sexual Harassment Guidance which covers harassment by teachers as
well as peers.40 3 The OCR found it appropriate to apply many of the
principles developed in the case law of Title VII to the Title IX con-
text, including agency rules to determine a school's liability for harass-
ment by its employees. 4 4 As in employment litigation, the result is a
mixture of imputed and personal fault liability. Under this approach,
"a school will always be liable for even one instance of quid pro quo
harassment by a school employee in a position of authority, such as a
teacher or administrator, whether or not it knew, should have known
or approved of the harassment at issue.'"4°5 Taking the lead from the
common law and Restatement of Agency § 219(2), however, a school
will not be liable for hostile environment sexual harassment unless
one of the prerequisites pertains: the employee acted with apparent
authority, or was aided in carrying out the sexual harassment by his
position of authority, or the school had notice (knew or should have
known) about the harassment.4 06 The complexities of the factual situ-
ations mean that it is not always easy to determine whether sexual
harassment is of the quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual har-
assment type, or whether the school employee was otherwise acting
with apparent authority or was assisted by his position of authority in
inflicting the harassment.40 7 But insofar as personal fault may be re-
401. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 657.
402. See supra note 396.
403. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997) [hereinafter "Guidance"].
404. See id. at 12,039.
405. Id.
406. See id.
407. The Guidance notes that "the line between quid pro quo and hostile environment har-
assment will be blurred" in many cases, and the conduct may constitute both. Id. For example, a
teacher who uses the authority that he or she has to assign grades in order to force a student to
submit to sexual demands, engages in quid pro quo harassment, making the school liable for this
conduct. See id. But a teacher who explicitly or implicitly threatens to fail a student unless the
student responds to his or her sexual advances also creates a hostile environment, even if the
teacher does not follow through on the threats. See id. Other school employees, such as janitors
or cafeteria workers, may or may not be in a position of authority such that it is reasonable for a
student to believe they can impose educational sanctions if sexual favors are refused. See id.
The Guidance notes that the age of the student will affect the reasonableness of her or his belief.
See id.
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quired under some circumstances, notice (knew or should have
known) satisfies the standard.
408
The background of tort liability, as it may be discerned directly
from the common law or indirectly from Title VII and Title IX cases,
is somewhat muddled. But even in lawsuits against employers or insti-
tutions, courts often require proof of personal responsibility for failing
to prevent or halt sexual harassment or abuse in workplaces and
schools. The notice liability standard, therefore, has a legitimate place
in the dialogue with § 1983.
D. Notice Liability and Section 1983
As a preliminary and somewhat cautious proposal, this Article
suggests that "notice liability" should be the standard under § 1983 for
finding a supervisor individually liable for sexual abuse by a teacher or
other school official with power and authority over a student. This
notice liability would require proof of personal responsibility by the
supervisor. It incorporates foreseeability and causation. If the super-
visor has sufficient "notice" of the likelihood of constitutional harm,
he must respond. Personal liability will only be imposed on a supervi-
sor who knew or should have known there was a problem, but did
nothing to remediate. The failure to take remedial steps, in turn, must
have proximately caused the injury.
It may help to think about this standard by explaining what it
does not include: A supervisor would not be liable under § 1983 sim-
ply because he or she is the head of a department, a principal, or a
school board member and consequently has a statutory or common-
law duty or right of control over subordinates. In other words, no
supervisor would become liable merely because the sexual abuse took
place on his watch. This may be contrasted to potentially much more
liberal interpretation of the modern civil rights statutes, Title IX or
Title VII. The Office of Civil Rights notes in its latest guidance on
sexual harassment in schools that the line between quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment is often a difficult one to
draw. 409 A teacher who gives out unearned "A"s and passes out of
class in exchange for sex and who commits statutory rape as the price
for that indulgence no doubt creates a "hostile environment" within
the meaning of Title IX. But this conduct may also constitute quid
pro quo sexual harassment, which courts construing Title VII have as-
408. See id.
409. See supra note 407.
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sumed makes the employer liable without any need for notice.4 10 The
teacher is in effect the supervisor of the student with the power to
"explicitly or implicitly condition a student's participation in an educa-
tion program or school activity or base an educational decision on the
student's submission to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.
411
Furthermore, the agency principles of Restatement (Second) § 219(2)
imply that even if the sex abuse is treated as hostile environment har-
assment, the educational institution is likely to be liable whenever a
teacher is the perpetrator. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rationalized in its explanation for why it rejected the Title VII
analogue and its incorporated agency principles, teachers are almost
always "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of an agency
relationship":
The teacher's status as a teacher often enables the teacher to abuse
the student. Whether this power came from the aura of an instruc-
tor's authority, the trust that we encourage children to place in their
teachers, or merely the opportunity that teachers have to spend
time with children, [the teacher's] chances of initiating a sexual rela-
tionship with an adolescent.., were enhanced when the school dis-
trict hired him.
412
So even if the sexual abuse was outside the scope of employment and
therefore not covered by the first agency principle of § 219, it would
410. See, e.g., Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 102 F.3d 848, 860 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting
cases). In recognizing the two types of sexual harassment in Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), the Supreme Court left open the exact standards of supervisory liability, but indicated
that the principles reflected in Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-37 would apply. See Mer-
itor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Restatement distinguishes between the agent's conduct within the scope
of employment and outside the scope of employment, making the employer automatically liable
only for the former. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958). The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded in Ellerth that quid pro quo harassment is always
within the scope of employment because "the tangible employment benefit that is the 'quid' lies
within the supervisor's power to give or withhold only because the employer, as principal, en-
trusted the supervisor with that particular power." Ellerth, 102 F.3d at 860. Thus, the supervi-
sor's quid pro quo harassment is imputed to the employer without any further requirement.
411. Guidance, supra note 403, at 12038, 12046 n.5 (citing Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F.
Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (claiming that academic advance-
ment was conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes a claim of sex discrimina-
tion in education); see also Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746, 752 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (reexamination in a course conditioned on college student's agreeing to be spanked
should she not attain a certain grade may constitute quid pro quo harassment)).
412. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648,655 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Doe
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997) ("We rejected this agency
theory [finding liability if the employee was "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency realationship"] in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District. Under Rosa
H., school districts are not liable in tort for teacher-student harassment under Title IX unless an
employee who has been invested by the school board with supervisory power over the offending
employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, and failed to do so.").
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trigger employer liability under the second principle of the Restate-
ment.413 To avoid this result, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit refused to follow the agency model. By contrast, the notice
liability standard advanced here contains no such principle of imputed
liability. Regardless of whether the teacher offered grades in ex-
change for sex or was assisted in extracting the sex by his role and
authority as a teacher, the supervisor could not be individually liable
unless he was personally at fault.
414
The proposed notice liability standard also does not include an
action based solely on the school supervisor's "failure to protect" the
child from sexual abuse by a peer or other "private" party not within
the control of the school. That would be in the nature of a special
relationship claim seeking to impose liability on the supervisor di-
rectly for his own allegedly unconstitutional acts, raising all the
problems of DeShaney that were so carefully eschewed by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Taylor.415 This is both easier
from a supervisory liability viewpoint, and much harder with respect
to the underlying issue of constitutional liability. Instead of involving
a clearly established intentional deprivation of liberty by a teacher
acting under color of state law, this type of claim first has to resolve
whether the school child is sufficiently in the "custody" of the school
to create a new constitutional duty on the part of supervisory person-
nel to protect her. If the duty exists, on the other hand, it belongs to
the supervisor who may be held personally responsible for its
violation.
Nor would a generalized "failure to train" satisfy the proposed
standard for personal supervisory liability. In Deborah 0. v. Lake
Central School Corp.,41 6 the school and supervisory defendants were
charged with negligence in failing to supervise and train school per-
sonnel to detect sexual abuse. But the "failure to train" allegation
413. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 655.
414. Commentators who wish to see the scope of "notice liability" standards either extended
under Title VII or restricted, respectively, implicitly acknowledge that it is a tougher standard
requiring personal repsonsibility. Compare Verkerke, supra note 178, at 380 ("Advocates of
uncompromisingly vigorous enforcement of civil rights statutes would undoubtedly attack any
decision to impose new notice requirements as a condition for employer liability."), with Weddle,
supra note 394, at 737-38 (The "knew-or-should-have-known standard, which is characterized by
some as direct liability on the part of the employer, fails to ensure that workplaces are non-
discriminatory toward certain groups.... The employer is virtually able to ignore the possibility
of workplace harassment until it is reported. This fact creates an incentive that runs counter to
the preventive purposes of Title VII.").
415. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
416. No. 94-3804, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19194 (7th Cir. July 21, 1995).
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must be measured against the standard of City of Canton v. Harris,417
which requires a high degree of culpability for this remote first cause
by an impersonal entity. Either the need for the training must be so
obvious that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference, or the pat-
tern and frequency of constitutional violations must be so pervasive
that the failure to train amounts to acquiescence in that pattern.418
Even against individual defendants, who are not subject to Canton's
concerns, when the claim is based on "failure to train" alone, there
may be reasons to require more than simple notice liability. Perhaps
it is more correct to say, however, that the issue will be subsumed in
the more difficult task of proving proximate cause under those circum-
stances. Similarly, situations with a generalized danger of sexual
abuse, without notice of either a likely perpetrator or a likely victim,
should be analyzed as problems of proximate cause.
But notice liability should not require proof of the kind of persis-
tent pattern of constitutional violations which is necessary to establish
governmental liability. Nor should it permit supervisory officials to
escape liability if they do anything at all, no matter how little, how
late, regardless of the age of the children involved, or the inappropri-
ateness of the behavior that was observed by or reported to the school
officials.419
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's three-part test may
be closer in practice to notice liability than those circuits which make
"deliberate indifference" or "tacit authorization" into a separate
step.420 In the Fifth Circuit, when the supervisor learns of "facts or a
417. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). For a discussion of Canton, see supra notes 262-78 and accompany-
ing text.
418. See id. at 388-89.
419. See, e.g., Doe v. Claiborne, 103 F.3d 495, 513 (6th Cir. 1996) ("It may be freely conceded
that the actions of these individuals left a lot to be desired. They may have been sloppy, reckless,
or neglectful in the performance of their duties. But that is not enough for section 1983 liability
under the precedent laid down in Bellamy... and Barber."). School officials in Claiborne had
notice that the teacher was accused of sexually abusing nine different girls. Id. at 502. The DHS
instructed them to remove him from classroom contact while they investigated, which the school
did for that school year. See id. After DHS found four of the charges "founded," but reached a
"pretrial agreement" with the teacher in which they undertook neither to press nor to hinder
criminal charges against him or the revocation of his license, the school officials abdicated their
responsibilities. See id. Washing their hands of any independent judgment, the school officials
decided to view this as a total vindication of the teacher and they sought him out in order to
rehire him. See id. at 503. Although the principal was nervous in light of the old charges, new
rumors, and inappropriate behavior he himself observed, after one of the new reports was found
to be "unfounded" by the DHS, he let the victim ride on the team bus at which point the harass-
ment began, leading to abuse and statutory rape. See id.
420. But see Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 762 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing
jury verdict and judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence of "deliberate indifference" on the
part of the school board that transferred teacher to another school after the first incident but left
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pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior" pointing plainly to the like-
lihood that a teacher is sexually abusing a school child, the failure to
take action that is "obviously necessary to prevent or stop" the abuse
is deliberate indifference by definition.421 But the Courts of Appeals
for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits require more.422 The supervisor ap-
parently must have knowledge of a pattern of unconstitutional sexual
abuse itself, and not just of sufficient facts that would raise red flags
and alert them to the likelihood of a problem. The failure to remedi-
ate, in turn, may not itself constitute deliberate indifference. Re-
pressing and concealing complaints counts, but the mere failure to
investigate or act in the face of warning signals does not.
423
I am aware that the tenor of these remarks runs somewhat
counter to what the lower courts do with supervisory liability gener-
ally.424 I also am under no illusions about any attempt these days to
make it easier to recover against § 1983 defendants. But I suggest a
more tort-like approach to supervisory liability in part to provoke dis-
cussion. Notice liability does not run the risks of confusion inherent in
him in the classroom where he molested an elementary-school girl). Gonzalez, of course, is
quite different than individual supervisory liability cases because it involved municipal liability
under Monell. Judge Jolly, however, cited it with approval in Doe v. Taylor. The board in Gon-
zalez investigated and took some action after the first incident. See Gonzalez, 996 F.2d at 748-
49.
421. Doe, 15 F.3d at 454.
422. See supra notes 310-41 and accompanying text. Compare Claiborne, 103 F.3d at 513
("A plaintiff must show that, in light of the information the defendants possessed, the teacher
who engaged in sexual abuse 'showed a strong likelihood that he would attempt to' sexually
abuse other students, such that the 'failure to take adequate precautions amounted to deliberate
indifference' to the constitutional rights of students.... [A]nother way of analyzing this claim [is]
whether defendants' conduct amounted to a tacit authorization of the abuse.").
423. See, e.g., Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.3d F.2d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing from Stoneking II which involved five complaints received, repressed and con-
cealed). Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 730 (citing Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133-34 (3d. Cir.
1996)), held that the mere failure of supervisory officials to act or investigate cannot be the basis
of liability. On the other hand, officials cannot maintain a custom, practice, or usage that con-
dons or authorizes assaultive behavior. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit distinguished
the principal, who engaged in affirmative acts of keeping complaints against teachers at home in
a secret file and accusing one child victim of framing the teacher and forcing her to publicly
apologize for the charges, from the superintendent, who knew something about the complaints
but at most displayed inaction and insensitivity. See also Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985
F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1993) (even if could have done a more thorough investigation, distin-
guished from Stoneking II with its concealing complaints, discouraging, failing to investigate,
requiring complainants to apologize to accused teachers). The mere failure to investigate ru-
mors has not subjected a supervisor to liability. See Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 491 (10th Cir.
1995).
424. Some lower courts even require proof of active approval of the constitutional violation.
See, e.g., Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1182 (7th Cir. 1994) (supervisor with knowledge of
subordinate's conduct has to approve of it and of the basis of it).
For a widely-cited discussion of supervisory liability in general, see Maldonado-Denis v.
Castillo Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1994).
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the use of "deliberate indifference," a phrase with many roles in con-
stitutional and § 1983 jurisprudence. 425 Notice liability also permits a
less constrained consideration of what is basically a tort question:
Who should pay for an admitted constitutional deprivation? Section
1983 jurisprudence typically does not address risk management, insur-
ance, or the economic effect of alternate liability rules.426 It might be
interesting to think about some of this in what may be considered a
noncore area of § 1983. Supervisory liability is peripheral in a sense
quite unlike the first two issues of this paper. It neither implicates the
definition of the underlying constitutional values nor does it under-
mine "under color of state law," the key concept in Monroe's redis-
covery and reconstruction of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Instead,
it concerns allocation of liability between two levels of individual de-
fendants, once the initial constitutional violation under color of state
law has already been established.427
The nature and consequences of sexual abuse by teachers in
school also prompts me to favor a more inclusive rule of individual
liability. Instead of imposing liability only under limited circum-
stances where administrators actively suppress complaints and intimi-
date witnesses, I would like to see school officials held to a more
realistic duty of care and investigation of obviously inappropriate be-
havior. Sexual abuse in schools is often repetitive.428 Inappropriate
behavior may be open and rumors may circulate, but the ultimate con-
425. See supra notes 262-78 and accompanying text (on the significance of the heightened
culpability of "deliberate indifference" in the test for municipal liability for a failure to train);
notes 345-48 and accompanying text (the court of appeal's confusion of the underlying constitu-
tional state of mind requirement and the test for supervisory liability); see also Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 658 (5th Cir. 1997) (court of appeals seems to confuse
the statutory and constitutional dimensions: in interpreting what it holds to be an "intentional
discrimination" requirement of Title IX, the court looks to Eighth Amendment doctrine which
requires that prison conditions constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" only if prison officials
acted with subjective recklessness).
426. The Court has never considered the effect of rules making it relatively easier to target
the lowest-level government agent involved and more difficult to recover against a supervisor.
But see Schuck, supra note 27, at 324-27.
427. But see cases holding that although a supervisor, if found liable, might be acting under
color of state law, the perpetrator was not. See, e.g., Jojola, 55 F.3d at 490-94.
428. See, e.g., Doe v. Board of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (13 girls af-
fected during the time the supervisor failed to respond to complaints); see also J.O. v. Alton, 909
F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990) (case was settled after a number of depositions testified to the com-
monly-known reputation of the abuser as "Lester the Molester"); Stein, supra note 362, at 15. In
Doe v. Taylor, Coach Stroud had pursued another first-year high school girl before he targeted
plaintiff Doe successfully. See Doe, 15 F.3d at 446. The bus driver in Black allegedly molested a
number of six- to eight-year-old girls over a four year period. See Black v. Indiana Area Sch.
Dist., 985 F.2d at 708-09. Twelve children brought the § 1983 lawsuit in Jane Doe "A," after the
bus driver pled guilty to sexual abuse inflicted on five handicapped kids. See 901 F.2d at 642-43.
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stitutional injury is inflicted in secret.429 Just like the courts, supervi-
sors may be squeamish about sexual abuse complaints or not take a
child's word.4 30 School officials are well aware, on the other hand,
that permanent employees possess due process rights. They may be
reluctant to investigate or confront allegations that they believe may
involve them in litigation.431 Without an adequate doctrine of super-
visory liability, the incentives are all on one side. There is every rea-
son to ignore the warning signs, and none to beard even "Lester the
Molester." No one wants to put supervisors on the "razor's edge.
'432
But there is ample space between active suppression of complaints
and panicky firing of employees. There is room to revise the statutory
standard of supervisory care away from "deliberate indifference" and
toward "notice liability."
CONCLUSION
Line-drawing and dialogue-this Article promotes both exercises
in § 1983 jurisprudence. But both also must be done with care. The
rights which are enforceable under § 1983 have their origin in federal
and not state law. Thus, it is necessary to derive the claims of students
sexually abused by their teachers from the Constitution of the United
States, and not from ordinary crimes and torts. But that necessary
line-drawing should not be confused with another proposition that is
quite misleading. As Monroe taught, just because the same facts also
constitute violations of state law, an action for deprivation of federal
rights is not precluded. Overlapping claims are common and the fed-
429. See, e.g., Hollandsworth, supra note 109, at 118, 135. The coach who molested Jane Doe
had a reputation for being "too friendly," the librarian had complained to the principal about the
coach's behavior which she considered "child molestation," the coach had openly treated an-
other girl like his girlfriend, and rumors circulated in the high school about Jane Doe and Coach
Stroud. At the same time, while escalating his advances, the coach swore the school girl to
secrecy, telling her that he would lose his job and family if anyone found out about their relation-
ship. See id. at 135.
430. See e.g., Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 728, in which school officials forced one girl to pub-
licly apologize for framing the teacher.
431. Perhaps the fear of litigation by employees explains why the principal in Stoneking II
recorded complaints in a secret file he maintained at home. See Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 729.
432. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (rejecting
cause of action for the failure to protect child against his father's violence in part on grounds
would place child welfare workers on razor's edge of constitutional liability for taking a child
from their parents and liability of leaving a child in place). I have argued elsewhere that "delib-
erate indifference" is an appropriate resolution of the constitutional razor's edge created by the
confluence of two important rights. See Oren, DeShaney in Context, supra note 12. This is a
significantly different issue, however, than the allocation of responsibility for an unquestioned
constitutional violation. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to
extend Title VII to claim that improper investigation of sexual harassment claim itself consti-
tuted sexual harassment, because this would place employers on a "razor's edge").
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eral remedy is supplementary to whatever is available by virtue of
state law.
The federal remedy also protects federal interests through its
"under color of state law" requirement. Wrongs inflicted by state offi-
cials are treated differently than the crimes and torts of private thugs.
As a result, "scope of employment" precedent from the common law
neither addresses nor illuminates the meaning of under color of state
law in § 1983. Officials who act without the state's authorization
nonetheless wield the power and authority of the state. Whether or
not their actions were in the "scope of employment," if they abused or
misused the power granted by virtue of their state positions, they are
answerable in § 1983.
Federal law obviously also defines the limits of which defendants
are liable under the statute. This means that personal fault is the sine
qua non for finding any person liable for a violation of § 1983. But
the Court also has told us that the statute must be read against the
background of tort liability. It is possible to do this for supervisory
liability without trampling any federal interests. The question, after
all, is simply who will pay for an already established constitutional
violation which has been committed under color of state law. The an-
swer does not lie in reflexively seizing the toughest-sounding standard
from other areas of § 1983 jurisprudence. Rather, courts should con-
sider common law-sounding doctrines such as "notice liability," which
make an effort to balance the incentives so that supervisory officials in
school will have some reason to take seriously inappropriate behavior
with children and to uncover sexual abuse.
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